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UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES, ANTITRUST
AND CONSUMER WELFARE IN NORTH
CAROLINA
JOHN

F. GRAYBEAL:

North Carolina'sunfair trade practices act, section 75-1.1 of the
General Statutes of North Carolina, has the potential to operate
contrary to the interests of consumers. Plaintiffs in section 75-1.1
cases who prove monetary injury automatically collect treble
damages and they may obtain attorney fees as well. Federaland
North Carolinaantitrustlaw registers violations but only if market
competition and consumers have been adversely affected. Both
award treble damages to successful plaintiffs, and federal antitrust
law also awards attorney fees. Because of its three vaguely stated
offenses-"unfair methods of competition," " unfair acts" and
"deceptive acts"--section 75-1.1 has a broad and uncertain scope.
Lawyers and judges believe, and judicial decisions show, that
conduct can violate section 75-1.1 even though it does not violate
antitrust law or otherwise threaten competition or consumers. In
this Article, the author argues that such outcomes imperil
consumer welfare by threateningto punish with treble damage and
attorney fee penalties conduct that may be procompetitive and in
the best interestsof consumers.
This Article asserts that judicial interpretation of section 75-1.1
lacks precision and clarity. Although the statute is a verbatim
copy of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and North
Carolina courts have stated an intention to look to section 5
authoritiesfor guidance in interpretingsection 75-1.1, the statute's
terminology has challenged clear judicial interpretation. This
Article points out that many section 75-1.1 decisionsfail to identify
the specific component of the statute found to be violated, that
others identify the "wrong" part of the statute as the basis for the
decision, and that these errorshave adversely affected the analysis
and even the outcome of some cases. More importantly, this
Article notes certain cases in which a defendant was absolved of
an antitrust violation but left exposed to section 75-1.1 liability.
The author urges that the "unfair methods of competition"
component of the statute should be viewed simply as an antitrust
statute, reaching conduct that violates federal and state antitrust
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law. The authoralso suggests methods for controllingthe reach of
the other components of section 75-1.1 so that the statute's
potential to threatenprocompetitive activity will be reduced.
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INTRODUCTION

North Carolina's "unfair trade practices" statute, section 75-1.1
of the General Statutes, declares (1) "unfair methods of competition"
and (2) "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" unlawful. These will be
referred to in this Article as the "unfair methods" and
"unfair/deceptive" prongs of the statute. Now a verbatim copy of
section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act,' section 75-1.1
is relied upon heavily by claimants in commercial litigation in the
state A North Carolina federal judge has said that section 75-1.1
"constitutes a boilerplate claim in most every complaint based on a
commercial or consumer transaction in North Carolina."3 Such rich
litigation opportunities are not presented by section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act since it affords no private cause of action.
But the reasons for the heavy use of section 75-1.1 are clear. As with
other provisions of Chapter 75 containing state antitrust law
prohibitions, the winning plaintiff in a section 75-1.1 case

* Adjunct Associate Professor of Antitrust Law, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hili 1995-2000. A.B., 1959, Oberlin College; LL.B., 1962, Harvard Law School.
The author thanks Jonathan B. Baker, Peter C. Carstensen, and Jonathan Rose for helpful
comments.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000).
2. One author has counted more than 700 state and federal decisions "involving"
section 75-1.1. NOEL L. ALLEN, NORTH CAROLINA UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICE 6 (2d

ed. 2000).
3. Allied Distribs., Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 847 F. Supp. 376, 379 (E.D.N.C.
1993).

1930

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

automatically receives treble damages,4 and, perhaps more
importantly, his "duly licensed attorney" may get attorney fees.5
Consumer welfare is the most important concern of antitrust law
and policy.6 Generally, conduct does not violate antitrust standards
unless it imposes an adverse effect on market competition, and,
therefore, on consumers.

The concern expressed here is that

decisions under section 75-1.1 could threaten consumer welfare by
imposing the penalties of treble damages and attorney fees on
defendants whose conduct does not violate antitrust law. At the same

time, this Article recognizes that section 75-1.1 reaches conduct
condemned by business tort law and that, while some of that conduct
may harm the competitive process, it may not threaten consumer
welfare in the short run.
Despite its popularity and frequent appearance in the case
reports, the judicial interpretation of section 75-1.1 lacks precision
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (2001).
5. Section 75-16.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides that "the
presiding judge may, in his discretion, allow a reasonable attorney fee to the duly licensed
attorney representing the prevailing party" if he finds that "[tihe party charged with the
violation has willfully engaged in the act or practice, and there was an unwarranted refusal
by such party to fully resolve the matters which constitute the basis of such suit." Unlike
federal antitrust actions where, pursuant to section 4(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15(a) (2000), attorney fees are awarded to successful plaintiffs themselves, North
Carolina section 75-16.1 "awards" the fees to the plaintiffs lawyer. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7516.1 (2001).
6. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (The antitrust issue is
whether "the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers
and markets.").
"Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 'consumer welfare
prescription.'"
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (holding that
consumers are injured in their "property" when overcharged by price-fixing suppliers)
(quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978)). The Sherman Act
"was conceived of primarily as a remedy for '[t]he people of the United States as
individuals,' especially consumers." Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429
U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977) (quoting remarks of Sen. George, 21 CONG. REc. 1767-1768
(1890)). "The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will
produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services. 'The heart of our
national economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition.'" Nat'l Soc'y of
Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. FTC,
340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951)). To be condemned, the conduct of a monopolist "must harm the
competitive process and thereby harm consumers." United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam). "Probably most (but certainly not all) scholars
today accept the proposition that the antitrust laws either have, or should be treated as
having, the sole goal of consumer welfare or efficiency." RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK
H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIc NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS
154 (2d ed. 1981). To the extent that such a consumer welfare antitrust policy favors chain
retailers, including "big box" outlets that may be viewed as threats to locally-owned albeit
less efficient businesses and the cohesiveness or "downtown" vitality of smaller cities,
towns, and communities, relief should be sought in other, non-antitrust laws and policies.
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and clarity. This Article assesses section 75-1.1 decisions in light of
the North Carolina Supreme Court's announced intention to look to
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") authorities for guidance in
applying the statute and the FTC's application of section 5 of the FTC
Act, the parent statute of section 75-1.1. 7 Part I notes the direct
linkage between section 75-1.1 and section 5(a)(1) of the FTC Act.
Part II identifies cases in which courts applying section 75-1.1 follow
federal authorities, and Part IIl contains a summary of application of
section 5 by the FTC and by the courts that have reviewed its
decisions. Part IV notes the body of business tort law that relates
closely both to section 5 and to section 75-1.1. Since section 75-1.1
generally reaches conduct that amounts to a business tort, courts can
usefully refer to business tort law to provide greater certainty for
section 75-1.1 offenses.
The cases indicate that North Carolina practitioners and courts
believe that even when the plaintiff fails to show the defendant
violated federal or state antitrust law, the defendant may still be
subjected to treble damages and attorney fee penalties under section
75-1.1.8 Since antitrust law and policy are primarily concerned about
harm to consumers from adverse effects on market competition,9 such
an outcome creates the problem that cases finding violations of
section 75-1.1 where no consumer harm has been found will penalize
and/or deter procompetitive, proconsumer conduct. Part VI(A) of
this Article discusses cases in which such outcomes have occurred and
points to other factual situations in which such outcomes could occur.
Part VI(B) offers suggestions to avoid or minimize such results in the
future.
On the way to these observations, Part V(A) of this Article
observes that North Carolina courts (both state and federal) in many
decisions have failed even to identify the prong of section 75-1.1 upon
which the decision rests. Part V(B) points out that in other cases
courts have identified the "wrong" prong. The standard of proper
"prong identification" used here is derived from analysis of FTC
authorities showing that cases having antitrust characteristics should
be tested under the "unfair methods" prong while, generally, nonantitrust claims should be tested under the "unfair/deceptive" prong.
This review not only finds cases in which failure to identify the prong
or identification of the wrong prong is harmless, but it also finds

7. See infra notes 32-53 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 275-88 and accompanying text.
9. See supra note 6.
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others, noted in Part V(C), in which prong identification errors
adversely affected the analysis or the outcome or both. In applying
the South Carolina statutory equivalent of section 75-1.1, the Fourth
Circuit observed, "the ... statute is aimed at two distinct kinds of

conduct:
unfair or deceptive practices and anticompetitive
practices."' 10 While the parallel structure of the North Carolina
statute was subsequently recognized in a federal district court
opinion," the Fourth Circuit's observation is a basic point deserving
of more widespread appreciation by litigants and courts in section 751.1 cases.
Finally, Part VII(A) identifies cases that support those cited in
Part II, which state that courts applying section 75-1.1 should look to
federal authorities for guidance. Most of the cases discussed in Part
VII(A) are authority for the proposition that plaintiffs must
demonstrate an adverse effect on market competition in non-per se
antitrust cases decided under section 75-1.1. In doing so, those cases
follow federal antitrust authority. Part VII(B) of this Article,
however, criticizes the analysis of the North Carolina Court of
Appeals in a recent case z in which the court did not follow federal
precedent. With its consumer welfare emphasis, this Article in Part
VII(C) urges that courts applying section 75-1.1 should eliminate any
uncertainty that consumers, as well as competitors, have standing to
assert "unfair methods of competition" claims under the statute.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF SECTION 75-1.1 IN SECTION 5 OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT

As noted above, the roots of section 75-1.1 are in section 5 of the
FTC Act." That federal statute, which created the FTC, proscribed
only "unfair methods of competition" when first enacted in 1914.14 In
10. Chuck's Feed & Seed Co., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 810 F.2d 1289, 1292 (4th Cir.
1987).
11. Sewell Plastics, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 720 F. Supp. 1196, 1220 (W.D.N.C. 1989),
affd per curiam, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1990) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1110 (1991).
12. Van Dorn Retail Mgmt., Inc. v. Klaussner Furniture Indus., Inc., 132 N.C. App.
531,512 S.E.2d 456 (1999).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000).
14. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)). Congress established the FTC as an
administrative agency in part to assist in defining and applying the "rule of reason" that
had been adopted for antitrust purposes in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911). MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 101
(4th ed. 1997); LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 890 (2000). "One of the main reasons for
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response to judicial interpretation, the Wheeler-Lea Amendments of
1938 added to the FTC's jurisdiction "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices." 15 As adopted by the North Carolina General Assembly in
1969, section 75-1.1(a) closely mirrored FTC Act section 5(a)(1) in its
post-1938 form,'16 and after a 1977 amendment, it became a verbatim
copy of section 5(a)(1).' 7 Section 75-1.1(a) now reads: "[u]nfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
deceptive 18
acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared
unlawful.1
North Carolina's adoption of section 75-1.1 was part of a
nationwide trend towards the enactment of uniform unfair trade
practices law. In the 1960's, the FTC "began to collaborate in
antitrust and consumer protection matters with various state officials
and the Committee on Suggested State Legislation of the Council of
State Governments."'9 The result was the promulgation in 1967 of
creating the [FrC] ...was that Congress distrusted judicial determination of antitrust
questions. It thought the assistance of an administrative body would be helpful in
resolving such questions." Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir.
1986).
15. Act of March 21, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000)).
16. Act of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, § 1(b), 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930, 930 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (2001)).
17. Act of June 27, 1977, ch. 747, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 984, 984 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (2001)).
18. In its original form, section 75-1.1 prohibited unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices "in the conduct of any trade or commerce." § 1(b),
1969 Sess. Laws at 930 (emphasis added). The supreme court in State ex rel. Edmisten v.
J.C. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 316-17, 233 S.E.2d 895, 899 (1977) relied heavily on the
word "trade" to decide that the statute covered only "bargain, sale, barter, exchange or
traffic" in goods, but not abusive or harassing debt collection practices such as those at
issue. The court noted that federal authorities had decided that FTC Act section 5
covered debt collection practices but observed that "federal court decisions ...are not
controlling in construing the North Carolina Act." Id. at 315, 233 S.E.2d at 898. The
General Assembly acted promptly to overrule this decision legislatively. In the 1977
version of 75-1.1, subsection (b) defined "commerce" to exclude "professional services
rendered by a member of a learned profession" but otherwise to "include[] all business
activities, however denominated ....
" § 2, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws at 984. Subsection (c)
provided an exemption for newspapers, periodicals, radio or television stations, and other
advertising media lacking knowledge that an advertisement was false, misleading, or
deceptive and where the owner had no financial interest in the sale of the advertised
product. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(c) (2001).
19. William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade PracticeLegislation, 46 TULANE L. REV.
724, 730 (1972). See also Marshall A. Leaffer & Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions
Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private Uses of Federal Trade
Commission Jurisprudence,48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 521, 521-22 (1980) (noting that the
FrC recognized that enforcement of its prohibition against unfair and deceptive practices
could not be accomplished without assistance from the states).
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model legislation entitled the "Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Act.""0 As adopted by the states, these statutes are
referred to as "little FTC Acts" or "UDAP" statutes for "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices." All fifty states and the District of
Columbia eventually adopted some form of UDAP statute.21
II. SECriON 75-1.1 INTERPRETATION PROBLEMS AND RELIANCE
UPON FEDERAL PRECEDENT

Courts applying section 75-1.1 have struggled with the
interpretation problems created by the statute. For practitioners and
judges applying section 75-1.1, its language is the beginning of the
trouble. The inherently vague term "unfair" is used repetitively,
immediately raising a question about the differences, if any, among
(a) "unfair acts," (b) "unfair practices" and (c) "unfair methods of
competition."'
Moreover, the common law tort of "unfair
competition" is suggested but not specifically named.
North Carolina courts have manfully attempted to articulate
definitions of the three offenses stated by the statute, although one
early decision questioned whether such definitions were possible or
even desirable. Speaking to the "unfair methods of competition"
prong, the court of appeals lamented, "No precise definition of the
term 'unfair methods of competition' as used in G.S. 75-1.1 is
possible. Perhaps it is not even desirable that there be one. '' 3 The
court has also said that "[u]nfair competition has been referred to in
terms of conduct 'which a court of equity would consider unfair' ....
Thus viewed, the fairness or unfairness of particular conduct is not an
abstraction to be derived by logic."'24
Regarding the two offenses included in the "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices" prong of the statute, the North Carolina Supreme
Court has said, "A practice is unfair if it is unethical or unscrupulous,

20. Leafer & Lipson, supra note 19, at 521-22; Lovett, supranote 19, at 730.
21.

JONATHAN SHELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE AcTs

AND PRACTICES 1 (5th ed. 2001). The UDAP version adopted by North Carolina was
"Alternative Form No. 1" of the model legislation. Lovett, supra note 19, at 732 (stating
that Alternative Form No. 1 has the broadest impact because it reaches both antitrust and
deceptive practices).
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (2001).
23. Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 38 N.C. App. 393, 404, 248 S.E.2d 739,
746 (1978).
24. United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 102 N.C. App. 484, 491, 403 S.E.2d 104, 109
(1991) (quoting McDonald v. Scarboro, 91 N.C. App. 13, 18, 370 S.E.2d 680, 683-84
(1988)).
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and it is deceptive if it has a tendency to deceive." ' The oft-cited,
more complete statement of unfairness is that "[a] practice is unfair
when it offends established public policy as well as when the practice
is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially

injurious to consumers." 26 Also, "[a] party is guilty of an unfair act or

practice when it engages in conduct which amounts to an inequitable
assertion of its power or position."' 7 As for deception, "a practice is
deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive; proof of actual

deception is not required."'

Therefore, statements that "are literally

true ...may still be deceptive." 29 In addition, whether a trade
practice is unfair or deceptive "usually depends upon the facts of each
case and the impact the practice has in the marketplace."3
An important limitation on the scope of unfairness-and,
perhaps, deception-lies in the language used by the Fourth Circuit in
affirming the denial of a treble damage award under section 75-1.1
after the jury found breach of contract. The court observed that,
because "unfairness inheres in every breach of contract, ...[i]f such
an award is to be trebled, the North Carolina legislature must have
intended that substantial aggravating circumstances be present."31

25. Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 656, 548 S.E.2d 704, 711 (2001). The court also
repeated the long-standing proposition that "[t]he determination as to whether an act is
unfair or deceptive is a question of law for the court." Id. This principle is traceable to
Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975), where, since the facts were stipulated,
the court said that "[o]rdinarily it would be for the jury to determine the facts, and based
on the jury's finding, the court would then determine as a matter of law whether the
defendant engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or
commerce." Id. at 310, 218 S.E.2d at 346-47. This displacement of the jury from
"meaningful involvement in the application of section 75-1.1" was the subject of critical
comment at the time. James McGee Phillips, Jr., Comment, ConsumerProtection-Hardy
v. Toler: Applying the North Carolina Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation-WhatRole
for the Jury?, 54 N.C. L. REV. 963, 970 (1976).
26. Johnson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 263, 266 S.E.2d 610, 621
(1980), overruled on other grounds by Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc.,
323 N.C. 559, 374 S.E.2d 385 (1988). This formula originated in the FTC's cigarette
labeling rule published in 1964 stating the elements of an "unfair act or practice." Trade
Regulation Rule on Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in
Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8348-51 (June 22, 1964),
withdrawn, 30 Fed. Reg. 9484, 9485 (July 28, 1965). The formula was apparently first
stated in this form in Spiegel,Inc v. FTC,540 F.2d 287,293 (7th Cir. 1976), which relied on
FTC v.Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233,244-245 (1972), which had quoted the FTC
rule.
27. Johnson,300 N.C. at 264,266 S.E.2d at 622.
28. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539,548,276 S.E.2d 397,403 (1981).
29. Johnson,300 N.C. at 265,266 S.E.2d at 622.
30. Id. at 262-63,266 S.E.2d at 621.
31. United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985,992 (4th Cir. 1981).
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Faced with these new and uncertain legal phrases adopted from
the federal statute, the North Carolina courts unsurprisingly have
looked to federal authorities for assistance in their interpretation of
section 75-1.1.32 In its first section 75-1.1 decision,33 the North
on appeal
Carolina Supreme Court indicated that federal decisions
4
from the FTC may provide guidance in interpretation.3
Two years later, when the court in State ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C.
Penney Co.35 departed from federal authority, it was met with a
prompt legislative rejoinder in the form of an amendment to the
statute. 6 As a result, three years after Penney, the court in Johnson v.
Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company3 7 returned to the Hardy
formula of looking "to the federal decisions interpreting the FTC Act
3
for guidance in construing the meaning of section 75-1.1."1
In some cases, courts apply federal authorities quite rigorously.
For example, in cases involving securities transactions, the North
Carolina courts have gone well beyond the recitation of formulae
and, relying on federal precedent to the effect that FTC Act section 5
does not apply to securities transactions, have straightaway held that
such transactions are not covered by section 75-1.1. 3 1 Some decisions
have announced flatly that "proof of conduct violative of the
32. Indeed, twenty of the state UDAP statutes "specifically direct the state courts to
employ the jurisprudence of the FTC, the federal courts, or both in construing the
enumerated statutory proscriptions." Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 19, at 533.
33. William B. Aycock, North CarolinaLaw on Antitrust and Consumer Protection,60
N.C. L. REv. 205,210 (1982).
34. Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 308,218 S.E.2d 342,345 (1975). Although the court
also indicated an interest in looking to the decisions of other state courts applying similar
state statutes, it proceeded to its decision without examining the outcomes in either
federal or state decisions. Id. at 308-10,218 S.E.2d at 345-47.
35. 292 N.C. 311,316-17,233 S.E.2d 895,899 (1977).
36. See supra note 18 (noting that the General Assembly provided a new definition
for "commerce").
37. 300 N.C. 247, 266 S.E.2d 610 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Meyer &
Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 323 N.C. 559,374 S.E.2d 385 (1988).
38. Id. at 262,266 S.E.2d at 620. Again though, as in Hardy, the court seemed to gain
no benefit from the factual similarity of any federal precedent. It found one defendant's
conduct not unfair because the defendant was "cooperative," and it found another
defendant's statements not deceptive because they were truthful and otherwise had no
"capacity or tendency to deceive." Id. at 265,266,266 S.E.2d at 622-23.
39. HAJMM Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 328 N.C. 578, 593, 403 S.E.2d 483,
492 (1991). The court said: "In Skinner [v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 314 N.C. 267, 275, 333
S.E.2d 236, 241 (1985)], we held that 'securities transactions are beyond the scope of
N.C.G.S. see. 75-1.12" HAJMM, 328 N.C. at 593,403 S.E.2d at 492 (quoting Skinner, 314
N.C. at 275,333 S.E.2d at 241). Skinner relied on Lindner v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc.,
761 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1985), where the Fourth Circuit concluded that section 75-1.1 did
not apply to securities transactions because no court had interpreted the FTC Act to apply
to securities transactions. HAJMM, 328 N.C. at 593, 403 S.E.2d at 492.
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Sherman Act is proof sufficient to establish a violation of the North
Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act."' Furthermore, in accord with
federal precedent, the weight of section 75-1.1 authority holds that
plaintiffs in antitrust cases brought under the statute will be required
to show that the defendant's conduct had or threatened an adverse
effect on market competition.41 Surprisingly, however, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals recently held, in Van Dorn Retail
Management, Inc. v. Klaussner Furniture Industries, Inc.,42 that
section 75-1.1 does not reach secondary line price discrimination4 3
notwithstanding well-established authority that it is reached by
section 5 of the FTC Act.'
North Carolina courts have also looked to federal antitrust
precedent to interpret the "pure antitrust" provisions of Chapter 75.
These include section 75-1, the now repealed section 75-5(b) and new
section 75-2.1, adopted in 1996. 41 An early example is Rose v. Vulcan
Materials Co.46 In this case, the court declined to find that a contract
providing for a discriminatorily low price to one customer violated
section 75-1, barring contracts in restraint of trade, because no federal
cases were cited showing such contracts to be in violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act, which also bars contracts in restraint of trade.47
The court said that "the body of law applying the Sherman Act,

40. ITCO Corp. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 722 F.2d 42, 48 (4th Cir. 1983). Citing ITCO,
the court in L.C. Williams Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp., 625 F. Supp. 477,481 (M.D.N.C. 1985),
said, "Section 75-1.1 is a comprehensive law designed to include within its reach the
federal antitrust laws." One voice in the wilderness, long since repudiated by later
decisions, claimed in a section 75-1.1 context that "[t]he federal statutes and the judicial
interpretations thereof, however, are not applicable to the North Carolina statutes under
discussion." Am. Rockwool, Inc. v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 640 F. Supp. 1411,
1434 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
41. These cases are discussed in Part VII(A), infra.
42. 132 N.C. App. 531,512 S.E.2d 456 (1999).
43. See infra note 402.
44. Van Dorn, 132 N.C. App. at 531-32, 512 S.E.2d at 457. For the federal precedent,
see I ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 455, 607
(5th ed. 2002) [hereinafter ANTITRUST L. DEV.], and cases cited. The court in Van Dorn
departed from the federal precedent because it felt obliged to follow Rose v. Vulcan
Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643, 194 S.E.2d 521 (1973), where the court said that section 755(b)(5), now repealed, prohibited only primary line discrimination. Section 75-1.1 was not
involved in Rose since the cause of action there accrued before the effective date of the
statute. Van Dorn, 132 N.C. App. at 531-32, 512 S.E.2d at 457. This case is discussed at
greater length in Part VII(B), infra.
45. A summary of North Carolina antitrust law appears in II ABA SECrION OF
ANTITRUST LAW, STATE ANTITRUST PRACTICE AND STATUTES, Chapter 35 (2d ed.
1999).
46. 282 N.C. 643, 194 S.E.2d 521 (1973).
47. Id. at 657, 194 S.E.2d at 531.
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although not binding upon this Court in applying [section] 75-1, is
nonetheless instructive in determining the full reach of that statute." 8
A more recent example is the North Carolina Supreme Court's
adoption of the federal "filed rate doctrine"49 to bar antitrust claims
brought under sections 75-1 and 75-1.1.50 The court approved the
reasoning of the court of appeals" which stated that "[o]ur Supreme
Court has held that federal precedent is instructive in interpreting
Chapter 75 due to the similarity between provisions of Chapter 75
and the federal antitrust laws"'52 and where it had expressed the
"desire to insure uniformity with federal antitrust law in order to
avoid forum shopping."'53 In summary, while the line is not
completely straight because of Penney, Van Dorn, American
48. Id. at 655, 194 S.E.2d at 530.
49. Originating in Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922), and
sometimes referred to as the "Keogh" doctrine, the filed rate doctrine prevents claims for
damages by antitrust plaintiffs where the rates charged by the defendants were filed for
approval with a regulatory agency and became the "lawful" rates. Issues surrounding the
doctrine include whether it may also be used by regulated defendants to bar injunctive
relief and whether it is an obstacle for competitor suits as well as customer claims. See
ANTITRUST L. DEv., supranote 44, at 1240-42.
50. N.C. Steel, Inc. v. Nat'l Council on Comp. Ins., 347 N.C. 627, 632, 496 S.E.2d 369,
372 (1998).
51. Id.
52. N.C. Steel, Inc. v. Nat'l Council on Comp. Ins., 123 N.C. App. 163, 171,472 S.E.2d
578, 582 (1996).
53. Id. at 172, 472 S.E.2d at 583. The court said that "absent compelling reasons to
the contrary, we are not inclined to permit a remedy under state law that is not allowed
under federal law." Id. Interestingly, in another Court of Appeals decision issued
approximately one month after its decision in N.C. Steel and authored by the same judge,
the court in fact granted a major remedy under state law that is not allowed under federal
law. Hyde v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 123 N.C. App. 572, 582, 473 S.E.2d 680, 686 (1996). In
Hyde, the court, not citing N.C. Steel, decided that "indirect purchasers" could recover
under North Carolina General Statutes section 75-16, reasoning in part that a 1969
amendment of section 75-16, which broadened the class of persons given standing,
occurred at a time when the federal courts allowed standing to indirect purchasers under
section 4 of the Clayton Act. Id. at 579, 473 S.E.2d at 685. The court held that
circumstance more critical than pure adherence to federal law, id., which would have
required adoption of the federal rule articulated in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720, 746-47 (1977), which held that indirect purchasers could not recover. Implicit in the
material presented thus far is the proposition that state antitrust laws have not been found
to be preempted by federal law. See ANTITRUST L. DEV., supra note 44, at 815-18.
Indeed, the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Hyde noted that the Supreme Court's
decision in California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989) had held that state
"IllinoisBrick repealer" statutes granting indirect purchasers the right to recover damages
under state antitrust law were not preempted even though Illinois Brick denied them that
right under federal law. Hyde, 123 N.C. App. at 576, 473 S.E.2d at 683. Similarly,
although federal preemption occurs in some specific areas of regulation involving unfair
and deceptive trade practices, "case law is heavily weighted against merchant defenses
that a state [unfair trade practices] statute conflicts with and is preempted by federal law."
SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 21, at 82.
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Rockwool, Inc. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,5 4 and Hyde v.
Abbott Laboratories,Inc.,55 courts applying section 75-1.1 and other
provisions of Chapter 75 have demonstrated a strong tendency to rely
on federal precedent.
III. A SUMMARY OF THE SCOPE OF SECTION 5 OF THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION ACT
Given North Carolina's clearly stated intention to rely on federal
precedent interpreting section 5 of the FTC Act in applying section
75-1.1, and the broader policy of relying on federal antitrust
authorities generally, evaluating the interpretation of section 75-1.1
made by state and federal courts requires examination of federal
precedent.
A.

The "Unfair Methods of Competition" Prong

The FTC and the reviewing federal courts apply the "unfair
methods of competition" prong of FTC Act section 5 to conduct
raising antitrust issues or concerns and the "unfair and deceptive acts
and practices" component to practices not raising such issues.55
At a minimum, the FTC may find conduct to be an "unfair
method of competition" under section 5 if such conduct violates the
Sherman, Clayton, or Robinson-Patman Acts. 7 Moreover, the FTC
has authority to find antitrust-type conduct an unfair method of
competition even though it would not violate an antitrust law.58
B.

The Necessity for an Adverse Effect on Market Competition

Aside from the FTC's authority to reach beyond the letter of the
antitrust laws as it exercises its "unfair methods of competition"
jurisdiction, it has become well established that, in deciding antitrust
cases, the FTC and federal courts will apply either the "per se" rule of
antitrust illegality or the so-called "rule of reason," which requires a
finding that the conduct has produced or threatens to produce net

54. 640 F. Supp. 1411 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
55. 123 N.C. App. 572,473 S.E.2d 680 (1996).
56. The FTC's Bureau of Competition focuses on the "unfair methods" prong while
its Bureau of Consumer Protection applies the unfair/deceptive prong.
57. "[T]he scope of Section 5 is at least as broad as that of the combined Sherman,
Clayton, and Robinson-Patman Acts." ANTITRUST L. DEv., supra note 44, at 607. The
substantive provisions of the Sherman Act are 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2000); the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (2000); and the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2000).
58. See infra Part III(C).
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harm to market competition. 9 The per se rule remains in place to
invalidate agreements among competitors regarding prices, output,
geographical and customer allocations, and vertical minimum resale
price maintenance (where the producer requires its customer to resell
the product at or above a specified minimum price).' Certain other
practices, such as boycotts and tying arrangements, once arguably
condemned by the per se rule are now only uncertainly so. 61 As a
59. Some antitrust practitioners believe that under the rule of reason, the defendant
always wins. But now-deceased antitrust scholar Phillip Areeda was well known for his
observation that "the rule of reason can sometimes be applied in the twinkling of an eye."
P. AREEDA, THE "RULE OF REASON" IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: GENERAL ISSUES 3738 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. June 1981), quoted in Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FrC, 526 U.S. 756, 763
(1999). The rule's application in many cases has not been arduous. E.g., FTC v. Indiana
Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (stating that "[a]pplication of the Rule of
Reason to these facts is not a matter of any great difficulty"). In other cases, courts have
applied the rule of reason using "quick look," "abbreviated," or "truncated" analysis,
although the Court in California Dental reversed the Ninth Circuit for doing so, and for
allowing the FTC to do so, in that case. 526 U.S. at 763-65. On the other hand,
application of the per se rule is not always so automatic. The Supreme Court
acknowledged long ago that "there is often no bright line separating per se from Rule of
Reason analysis" and that "[pier se rules may require considerable inquiry into market
conditions before the evidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct." Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85,104 n.26 (1984).
60. The per se rule condemns certain practices promptly, denying the defendant even
an opportunity to submit evidence of business justification. "[T]here are certain
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack
of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use." N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Price and market
allocation agreements among competitors-horizontal agreements-have long been
condemned as per se illegal. As a result of the recent decision in State Oil Co. v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3, 18 (1997), vertical maximum resale price maintenance (where the producer
requires its customer to resell the product below a specified maximum price) is no longer
subject to the per se rule, but to the rule of reason.
61. See Nynex v. Discon, 525 U.S. 128, 130 (1998) (holding that the per se group
boycott rule did not apply); Indiana Dentists, 476 U.S. at 458 (boycotts); Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26-27 (1984) (tie-ins). The Court in Nynex noted
that the Second Circuit had allowed "evidence of 'justification,'" and it quoted
approvingly two antitrust scholars: "Boycotts are said to be unlawful per se but
justifications are routinely considered in defining the forbidden category." 525 U.S. at
135, (quoting 7 P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 1510, at 416 (1986)).
In Indiana Dentists,the Court observed that the practice at issue "resembles practices that
have been labeled 'group boycotts' "and that "this Court has in the past stated that group
boycotts are unlawful per se." 476 U.S. at 458. However, the Court decided to "evaluate
the restraint at issue in this case under the Rule of Reason rather than a rule of per se
illegality." Id. at 458-59. The Court in the NCAA case said that while it had "spoken of a
'per se' rule against tying arrangements, it has also recognized that tying may have
procompetitive justifications that make it inappropriate to condemn without considerable
market analysis." 468 U.S. at 104 n.26. In Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit vacated the district
court's finding of liability on the tying claim using the per se rule and remanded for
evaluation of the claim under the rule of reason. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
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result, most antitrust claims are now analyzed under the rule of
reason.
Application of this rule necessitates a determination of whether
the conduct has had, is having, or threatens to have an adverse effect
on market competition. As the Supreme Court said in State Oil Co. v.
Khan:
[M]ost antitrust claims are analyzed under a "rule of
reason," according to which the finder of fact must decide
whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable
restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of
factors, including specific information about the relevant
business, its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed, and the restraint's history, nature and effect.62
Today, whether there has been or will be an adverse effect on
market competition translates to whether there has been or will be a
reduction in market output and/or an increase in market prices.63
F.3d 34,46 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam). By all past understanding, conduct is not subject
to the per se rule if the defendant is allowed to offer evidence of "justification." Such
evidence has in fact been routinely admitted in boycott and tie-in cases.
62. 522 U.S. at 10. The Supreme Court long ago said, "As its name suggests, the rule
of reason requires the factfinder to decide whether under all the circumstances of the case
the restrictive practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition." Arizona v.
Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982). And the lower courts got the
message. "Plaintiffs' initial burden under the rule of reason analysis is to show that the
alleged restraint had a 'substantially adverse' effect on competition in the relevant
market.... If Plaintiffs cannot establish an anticompetitive effect, there is no cause of
action under section 1 of the Sherman Act." Sea-Roy Corp. v. Parts R Parts, Inc., 1998-1
Trade Cases (CCH) 72,155, at 81,990-91 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (mem.), affd per curiam, Nos.
98-1028, 98-1546, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3383 (4th Cir. Mar. 4, 1999 unpublished). The
same is true in a monopolization context: "[To be condemned as exclusionary, a
monopolist's act must have an 'anticompetitive effect.' That is, it must harm the
competitive processand thereby harm consumers." Microsoft,253 F.3d at 58.
63. Pointing to output as key, the Court in Indiana Dentists, after noting that the
search was for any adverse effects on competition, said that" 'proof of actual detrimental
effects, such as a reduction of output' can obviate the need for an inquiry in market
power." 476 U.S. at 460-61, (quoting 7 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1511, at 429
(1986). Applying the rule of reason in the NCAA case, the Court said: "Restrictions on
price and output are the paradigmatic examples of restraints of trade that the Sherman
Act was intended to prohibit." 468 U.S. at 107-08. In California Dental, the Court noted
that the issue is "whether a producer-imposed output limitation has the anticompetitive
effect of artificially raising prices," and quoted the Seventh Circuit: "[R]aising price,
reducing output, and dividing markets have the same anticompetitive effects." 526 U.S. at
777 (quoting Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat'l Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 594-95 (7th
Cir. 1984). The Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors jointly
issued by the FTC and the Department of Justice in April 2000 state: "The central
question is whether the relevant agreement likely harms competition by increasing the
ability or incentive profitably to raise price above or reduce output, quality, service, or
innovation below what likely would prevail in the absence of the relevant agreement."
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Certain aspects of the defendant's conduct may enhance output and
procompetitive effects, while other aspects may produce
anticompetitive effects. In such cases, the court will need to balance
the pro- and anticompetitive effects in order to determine the net
effect on competition. 6' The key inquiry, however, pertains to market
competition, not about an adverse effect on any particular
competitor. The antitrust laws "were enacted 'for the protection of
competition not competitors.' "65 "[H]arm to one or more competitors
will not suffice."66 And, as the Supreme Court noted in Brooke
Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,67 "[e]ven an act
of pure malice by one business competitor against another does not,
without more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws."6 For
such offehises the laws pertaining to business torts and even criminal
laws may apply.69 Federal antitrust law today fully recognizes that the
more efficient firm may-indeed, should-drive from business the
less efficient one.7"
FTC & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS
AMONG COMPETITORS 10 (April 2000), available at http:l/www.ftc.govlos/2000/04/ftcdoj
guidelines.pdf. In Sea-Roy, the court found no adverse effect on market competition on
the basis of evidence indicating price declines, no reduction in output, and no "evidence
... [of] sufficient market power to potentially injure competition in the relevant market."
1998-1 Trade Cases (CCH) at 81,994 (mem.).
64. See, e.g., CaL Dental, 526 U.S. at 759 (questioning whether the net effect of the
Association's advertising requirements was to promote or hinder competition); HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 257 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing the balancing
process).
65. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (quoting
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)); McDaniel v. Greensboro
News Co., 1984-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 65,792 (M.D.N.C. 1983) ("The antitrust laws exist
to protect competition, not competitors."); Sewell Plastics, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 720 F.
Supp. 1196, 1218 (W.D.N.C. 1989) (stating that "[a]nticompetitive actions are not those
'that merely injure competitors, but [are] actions that harm the competitive process, a
process that aims to bring consumers the benefits of lower prices, better products and
more efficient production methods' ") (quoting Interface Group, Inc. v. Mass. Port Auth.,
816 F.2d 9, 10 (1st Cir. 1987)), aff'd per curiam, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1990) (unpublished
table decision).
66. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58.
67. 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
68. Id. at 225. "As harsh as it may be, behavior that hurts or even destroys an
individual competitor does not violate the Sherman Act unless it also has an adverse effect
on competition as a whole." Sea-Roy, 1998-1 Trade Cases (CCH) at 81,993 (mem.).
69. "[O]ther laws, for example, 'unfair competition' laws, business tort laws, or
regulatory laws provide remedies for various 'competitive practices thought to be
offensive to proper standards of business morality.'" Nynex v. Discon, 525 U.S. 128, 137
(1998) (quoting from 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
651d, at 78 (1996)) (noting that several remedies are available to punish offensive and
immoral business practices).
70. "Fundamental canons of antitrust law recognize the legitimacy of permitting the

2002]

UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES

1943

Closely related to the requirement in antitrust cases that harm to
the competitive process be shown is the necessity in private antitrust
cases for the plaintiff to show "antitrust injury. ' 71 Although
inapplicable to the FTC, the private antitrust complainant must show
not only that the defendant's actions harmed market competition but
also that the specific injury it suffered was of "the type the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent and that flow[ed] from that which
ma[de] the defendants' acts unlawful. '72 The doctrine has been
applied where the antitrust plaintiff complained about mergers of
competitors. In those cases, the mergers were found to violate the
standards of section 7 of the Clayton Act since they increased market
concentration sufficiently to threaten post-merger collusion, overt or
tacit. In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,73 however, the
Supreme Court rejected the damage claim where the plaintiff argued
that, absent the merger, the acquired facilities would have failed
altogether, thus enabling the plaintiff to achieve higher prices and
profits. 74 The Court indicated that the plaintiff's damages "did not
occur 'by reason of that which made the acquisitions unlawful."'75 In
Cargillv. Monfort of Colorado,Inc.,76 the Court applied the doctrine
to deny injunctive relief, observing that since an illegal merger should
benefit an uninvolved industry competitor by producing higher prices
and profits, the plaintiff must have feared that the merger would
increase rather than reduce competition. The Court held that a
following a
"threat of loss of profits due to possible price competition
77
merger does not constitute a threat of antitrust injury.
Finally, in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co. 7 8 the
plaintiffs were denied damages where they complained of an illegal
agreement between Atlantic Richfield and its dealers whereby the
dealers would charge no more than specified prices for gasoline.7 9
Although, at that time, the agreement was a per se violation of
natural economic forces of free enterprise to drive inefficient producers of goods and
services out of the market, and replace them with efficient producers." Re/Max Int'l, Inc.
v. Realty One, Inc., 1999 FED. App. 012ap, 173 F.3d 995,1000 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
122 S.Ct. 1539 (2002).
71. See PHILLIP AREEDA AND LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS,

TEXT, CASES 85-88 (5th ed. 1997).
72. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,489 (1977).
73. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
74. Id. at 488-89.
75. Id. at 488.
76. 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
77. Id. at 116-17.
78. 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
79. Id. at 331.
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section 1 of the Sherman Act, 0 the plaintiffs were denied damages
despite their argument that defendants' pricing agreement deprived
them of the opportunity to charge higher prices and obtain bigger
profits.8 1 The Court reasoned that "any injury to competitors of the
retailers subject to ceiling prices resulted from competition and thus
was not the type of loss that antitrust law was designed to prevent."'
C. Section 5"s Coverage of Conduct not Reached by Antitrust Law
As noted above, the FTC may find a section 5 violation if the
conduct violates a federal antitrust law. The extent to which the FTC
may exercise jurisdiction over conduct not condemned by the
Sherman, Clayton or Robinson-Patman acts has been deferred to this
point because it tightly intersects the question of how meticulously
section 5 authorities should be incorporated into section 75-1.1 law.
Since the FTC jurisdiction issue has been exhaustively researched and
described by others, 83 a summary will suffice.
It seems clear from the legislative history that, even as originally
enacted in 1914, covering only "unfair methods of competition,"
section 5 was nevertheless intended to extend to two categories of
conduct not reached by the antitrust laws.81 The first category
80. As explained in supra note 60 and accompanying text, both minimum and
maximum resale price maintenance had been held to be per se violations of section 1 of
the Sherman Act until the Supreme Court, in State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997),
moved maximum resale price maintenance to the rule-of-reason category.
81. Atd. Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 335.
82. AREEDA & KAPLOW, supranote 71, at 87.
83. ANTITRUST L. DEV., supra note 44, at 608-15 (recognizing that the FTC has
"authority similar to a court of equity to consider public values beyond those included in
the antitrust laws"); 2 PHiLLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW I 302h, at 21-27 (2d
ed. 2000) (stating that FTC Act section 5 is not limited to the constraints of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts); G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 49-103 (1924) (discussing the FTC's
jurisdiction and procedure for filing and pursuing antitrust complaints); EARL. W.
KINTNER AND WILLIAM P. KRATZKE, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW §§ 48.7-48.9, at 12-19
(1988) (discussing section 5, the incipiency doctrine and the spirit and policies of antitrust
laws); Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Methods of Competition" in section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REv. 227,260 (1980) (noting that the FTC
has jurisdiction over both the Sherman and Clayton Acts); Thomas C. Willcox, Beyond the
Pale of the Sherman and Clayton Acts: The Federal Trade Commission's "Invitation to
Collude" Doctrineas a Deterrentto Violations of the Antitrust Laws, 39 ANTITRUST BULL.
623, 623-27 (1994) (finding that courts have determined that the FTC was created to
restrain unfair practices even though not covered by the Sherman or Clayton Acts).
84. By "antitrust laws" here is meant the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The Clayton
Act was also enacted in 1914 within two weeks of passage of the FTC Act, and
Congressmen apparently "had both bills in mind when they were debating the FTC Act."
Averitt, supra note 83, at 260 n.141. The Robinson-Patman Act, technically an
amendment to section 2 of the Clayton Act's provision relating to price discrimination,
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consisted of antitrust-type conduct even though not technically
covered by the antitrust laws-conduct at least lying within the
"shadow" of the Sherman and Clayton Acts or violating their
"spirit"-while the second category consisted of outright nonantitrust conduct, that is, conduct that not only failed to threaten
market or competitive consequences but as to which such concepts
were irrelevant.
1. Conduct Violating the "Spirit" of the Antitrust Laws
Using the standard terminology, the first category includes
conduct violating not the letter but the "spirit" of the Sherman Act,85
conduct consisting of an "incipient violation" of the antitrust laws,86
and conduct violating "competition policy as framed by the
Commission. ' In some sense, the 1972 Supreme Court decision in
FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson" is authority for the proposition that
section 5 reaches all these categories. The Court there upheld the
FTC, although it remanded the case, and emphasized that it had
ample authority to "consider[] public values beyond simply those
enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust

laws."89
The conduct challenged by the FTC consisted of Sperry &
Hutchinson's aggressive litigation policies, which had closed down
trading stamp exchanges." Sperry & Hutchinson objected to the
exchanges as threatening its position as the largest trading stamp
seller in the country. 91 All agreed that Sperry & Hutchinson's
conduct was not reached either by the letter or the "spirit" of the
antitrust laws.92 As opposed to its argument in the Supreme Court,93
the FTC's decision itself denounced Sperry & Hutchinson's conduct
both as an unfair method of competition and as an "unfair act and
94
practice.
was not enacted until 1936. Act of June 19, 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 13-13b, 21a (2000)).
85. Averitt, supra note 83, at 251.
86. Id. at 242.
87. Id. at 275. Averitt sets out an extensive and detailed review of the legislative
history supporting the FTC's jurisdiction in each of these areas.
88. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
89. Id. at 244.
90. Id. at 234.
91. Id. at 236-37.
92. Id. at 239.
93. Id.
94. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 146, 147 (1970), modified by FTC v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).

1946

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

Although it is not totally clear, there is a strong suggestion that
the Court thought the FTC's jurisdiction to reach "public values"
beyond those protected by the letter and spirit of the antitrust laws
was derived from the unfair/deceptive prong of the statute, rather
than the unfair methods prong.95 When it referred to these "public
values," the Court cited the FTC's own attempt in 1964 in the
"cigarette labeling rule" to define its "unfair acts or practices"
jurisdiction.9 6 In any event, even if trading stamps were still in vogue,
undoubtedly the FTC today would not bring another Sperry &
Hutchinson case challenging the practices as an "unfair method of
competition."
Recent FTC history may be thought of as falling into three time
periods: (1) the 1960's and early 1970's, when the courts granted wide
authority to the FTC to bring cases either on the basis of its
"incipiency" jurisdiction or on the ground that the conduct violated
the spirit although not the letter of the antitrust laws, or both; (2) the
1980's, during which the Commission itself and the reviewing courts
sharply curtailed FTC "unfair methods" jurisdiction and, in
particular, demanded that it act only on the basis of showing an
adverse effect on market competition; and (3) the more recent era of
the 1990's, during which the Commission has brought some cases and
obtained consent decrees where the conduct threatened competition
but did not violate the letter of the antitrust laws.97
In addition to Sperry & Hutchinson, the first time period includes
the tires, batteries, and accessories ("TBA") cases, such as, Atlantic
Refining Co. v. FTC,8 where the Supreme Court upheld the
Commission in issuing a cease and desist order against Atlantic for
pressing Goodyear TBA upon its franchised dealers even though not
formally "tying" them to its sales of gasoline.9 9 Citing the FTC's
95. Sperry & Hutchison, 405 U.S. at 244.
96. Id.
97. This course of events and the major cases are described in ANTITRUST L. DEV.,
supranote 44, at 608-15.
98. 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
99. Id. at 369. Tying occurs when the seller agrees to sell product A, the tying
product, but only on the condition that the buyer take product B, the tied product, as well.
One component of the offense is that the seller impose the requirement as a condition, not
simply provide it as an option:
[T]he essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller's
exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer into the
purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have
preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms.
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984). See generally
ANTITRUST L. DEV., supra note 44, at 175-212 (describing the components of the tie-in
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ability "to arrest trade restraints in their incipiency," the Court also
upheld the Commission in FTC v. Brown Shoe Co."° even though it
had not found in the language of section 3 of the Clayton Act that
there had been a substantial lessening of competition or tendency to
produce a monopoly where the respondent rewarded dealers who
agreed to purchase exclusively from Brown.'
The Second Circuit
also affirmed the FTC in Grand Union Co. v. FTC,"2 where the
respondent induced discriminatory promotional allowances from its
suppliers, a practice that technically did not violate the RobinsonPatman Act. 03
Undoubtedly related to the Chicago School renovation of
antitrust doctrine,' °4 the change of direction in the 1980's found the
FTC a willing participant in its own jurisdictional curtailment. Thus,
in General Foods Corp.,"°5 the FTC rejected the argument of its own
complaint counsel that respondent's predatory pricing practices
violated section 5 even though they did not amount to an attempt to
monopolize in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act because its
market share was insufficient to satisfy the "dangerous probability of

success" prong of the attempt offense. 6 The Commission declined to
rely on its "incipiency" authority recognized in Brown Shoe saying
that conduct not in violation of the Sherman Act would not be
condemned under the FTC Act. 1"

offense).
100. 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
101. Id. at 322.
102. 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
103. Section 2(f) of the Act prohibits purchasers from inducing or receiving price
discriminations, but the Act does not prohibit inducing or receiving discriminatory
promotional allowances. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)-(f) (2000).
104. Many learned articles by academics and others discuss and analyze the origins,
content, merits, limitations and future of the Chicago School model of antitrust law and
policy. Four important ones, together with an extensive bibliography of many others, are
collected in AN ANTFTRUST ANTHOLOGY (Andrew I. Gavil ed., 1996).
105. In re Gen. Foods Corp., 103 F.T.C. 204 (1984).
106. Id. at 366. "[T]o demonstrate attempted monopolization a plaintiff must prove (1)
that the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific
intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power."
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). Proof of accomplished
monopolization is more difficult, requiring "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident." United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 57071(1966).
107. Gen. Foods, 103 F.T.C. at 365-66.
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The Ninth Circuit established the new direction four years earlier
in Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC,1"8 when it reversed the FTC's order
against an industry-delivered pricing system where the Commission
record contained no evidence of actual collusion or anticompetitive
effect." 9 The Second Circuit issued a similar reversal in the Ethyl
case, which also involved delivered pricing and a "price signaling"
system, but where the FTC found a "significant adverse effect on
competition," although no overt collusion.110 The Second Circuit had
earlier reversed the FTC's order in Official Airline Guides, Inc. v.
FTC,"' where it had directed the monopolist publisher of flight
schedule information to include in its publication scheduling
information about commuter flights." 2 The problem faced by the
Commission in that case was that the respondent was not a
participant in the market in which adverse competitive effects
appeared."
More recently the FTC has filed section 5 cases where there was
no violation of other antitrust laws. This change is consistent with
post-Chicago school developments. Although courts have not yet
approved these initiatives, the Commission has obtained consent
decrees. The most prominent examples are five "invitation to
collude" cases, where the Commission alleged in its complaints that
one company either directly or implicitly invited another competitor
to enter into a price fixing arrangement.1 14 Such conduct is not price
fixing under section 1 of the Sherman Act because no accord or
agreement can be shown. Another example is the Dell Computer
complaint, which alleged unilateral conduct in violation of section 5
but did not allege a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act."'
108. 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980).
109. Id. at 582.
110. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128,130 n.2 (2d Cir. 1984).
111. 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980).
112. Id. at 291.
113. Id. at 293.
114. In re Stone Container Corp., 125 F.T.C. 853 (1998) (decision and order); Precision
Moulding Co., 122 F.T.C. 104 (1997) (decision and order); YKK (U.S.A.) Inc., 58 Fed.
Reg. 41, 790 (FTC 1993) (consent order), [1993-1997 Transfer Binder CCH] 23,355
(FTC July 1, 1993); AE Clevite, Inc., [1993-1997 Transfer Binder CCH] 23,354 (FTC
June 8, 1993); Quality Trailer Products Prod. Corp., [1987-1993 Transfer Binder CCH] $
23,247 (FTC Nov. 5, 1992); see ANTITRUST L. DEcV., supra note 44, at 613-14. Willcox
contends that the MeadJohnson case also fits within this category. Willcox, supra note 83,
at 633, 636-41; see Mead Johnson & Co., Federal Trade Commission Complaints and
Orders, [1987-1993 Transfer Binder CCH] 23,209 (FTC June 11, 1992).
115. Dell Computer Corp., No. C-3658; Statement of the Federal Trade Comm'n, Dell
Computer Corp., Dkt. No. C-3658 (May 20, 1996); see In re Dell Computer Corp., 131
F.T.C. 616 (1996).
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This summary of the exercise of FTC antitrust authority using
the "unfair methods of competition" prong of section 5 indicates that
the Commission's authority after the 1972 Sperry & Hutchinson
decision has been narrowed both by judicial review of FTC actions
and by the Commission's own evolving enforcement policies.
Undoubtedly, the FTC today will proceed with great caution under
section 5 to claim as an unfair method of competition any conduct
that does not violate the Sherman or Clayton Acts. In taking any
such action it will undoubtedly require that any such conduct either
produce or threaten an adverse effect on market competition or be
devoid of efficiency gains. "Invitations to collude" are a good
example of justifiable FTC action challenging conduct outside the
Sherman and Clayton Act domain, since they clearly threaten
anticompetitive consequences and have no efficiency justifications.
Professors Areeda, Hovenkamp, and Blair urge that "the spirit
and letter of the antitrust laws are identical" and that "sound policy
requires the same results under the Federal Trade Commission Act"
as are produced under the Sherman and Clayton Acts." 6 They add:
[T]here is a fundamental difficulty in distinguishing an
antitrustoffense under FTC Act [section] 5 from that under
the Sherman or Clayton Acts.... [T]he Sherman and
Clayton Acts are broad enough to cover any anticompetitive
agreement or monopolistic situation that ought to be
attacked whether "completely full blown or not."
The point is that sound Sherman Act analysis takes
account of all relevant policies bearing on the issue before
the enforcement agency. Accordingly, sound Sherman Act
analysis must also govern the application of [section] 5 to
antitrust-type offenses, except insofar as the FTC
enforcement route differs in some relevant way from
enforcement lawsuits initiated by the Justice Department or
by private parties." 7
These authors, however, concede that section 5 might be used to
reach non-collusive "oligopoly behavior when the Sherman Act's
requirements are not met" or "unaccepted solicitation[s] to form an
illegal conspiracy."' h The key prerequisite to FTC jurisdiction that
they would require in such cases "is a suspected injury to competition,
albeit one that does not easily fit into the technical standards of the

116. II PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW, § 302h at21 (2d ed. 2000).
117. Id. at 22.
118. Id.at 24.

1950

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

Sherman Act." 119 Further, they point to the unavailability of private
damage actions based on section 5 as a factor justifying the use of
"more aggressive substantive standards" under section 5 than under
120
the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
Any venturing of the FTC beyond existing antitrust limits raises
the question of the extent to which application of section 75-1.1
should follow; that is, the question is raised as to what extent North
Carolina courts should interpret and apply section 75-1.1 in complete
tandem with FTC (and judicial) action under section 5. The question

is raised because section 75-1.1, unlike section 5 of the FTC Act, is
available to private litigants pursuing non-public objectives combined
121
with automatic treble damages and the possibility of attorney fees.
As Areeda and Hovenkamp point out,122 it is one thing for the FTC
with its public policy goals and a staff of attorneys and economists to
carefully pursue conduct that falls outside antitrust limits where the
available relief consists of an order to cease and desist. As
Hovenkamp puts it, the "social cost of an error" by the FTC will not
be very great.'2 It may be quite a different thing for North Carolina
courts to authorize private litigants to pursue such claims where the

motivations, rewards, and relief are quite different.
A factor qualifying this concern is that many such section 5
precedents may not lend themselves readily to private lawsuits under
119. Id.
120. Id. at 23.
121. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §75-16 (2001) (awarding treble damages); §75-16.1
(providing for discretionary attorney fees).
122. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
[Section] 5 was conceived as a vehicle for evolving new administrative
prohibitions of conduct not previously thought unlawful, which is presumably the
reason that most of its sanctions are prospective only and invoked only by public
officials. The short of it is that it would make no sense-and it certainly was not
intended-to assimilate the entire body of unfair competition or business tort law
into [section] 2 of the Sherman Act, which is concerned with monopoly, not with
morality.
HIlA PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 349, 349-50
(2000).
123. HOVENKAMP, supra note 64, at 588. The FTC is not limited entirely to
prospective, cease-and-desist remedies. Pursuant to sections 5() and 5(m) of the FTC
Act, it has authority to seek "civil penalties" (currently in the amount of $11,000 per day)
from persons or firms violating cease and desist orders and final rules. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(),
(in) (2000); ANTITRUST L. DEv., supra note 44, at 662-65. It also has authority to obtain
monetary restitution for consumers pursuant to sections 19(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 57(b)) and 13(b) (15 U.S.C. § 53(b)) of the Act. See ANTITRUST L. DEV., supra note 44,
at 666-70. And, FTC v. Mylan Laboratories,Inc., 62 F. Supp.2d 25, 37 (D.D.C. 1999) held
that the FTC has the authority under section 13(b) to obtain disgorgement of profits or
"illegally obtained funds."
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section 75-1.1. For example, since mere "invitations to collude" do
not raise prices, they will not produce damage-suffering plaintiffs.
Private cases resulting only in injunctive relief are comparable to FTC
cases and can be accepted easily in North Carolina.124
2. Non-Antitrust Conduct as an Unfair Method of Competition
Having considered the extent to which conduct not prohibited by
the antitrust laws may be reached as an unfair method of competition
under FTC Act section 5, the next question is the extent to which
non-antitrust conduct is covered by the unfair methods prong of
section 5. Non-antitrust conduct is the second category covered by
section 5 as originally passed in 1914 when it referred only to "unfair
methods of competition." As noted above, this category consists of
conduct having no connection to traditional antitrust concepts. The
legislative history indicates that Congress intended some such
conduct to be reached as "unfair methods of competition" even
though it would be neater and cleaner if the "unfair methods"
category reached only antitrust offenses, including those covered by
FTC Act section 5 as stretched occasionally-and, hopefully,
prudently-by the FTC.12 With all antitrust, including antitrust
stretched by section 5, covered by "unfair methods of competition"
both under section 5 and under North Carolina's section 75-1.1, the
question is whether the unfair methods prong must also
accommodate other matters.
The prime candidate for such coverage is common law "unfair
competition." The FTC brought some "unfair competition" cases
during the period 1914-1938 relying on its "unfair methods of
competition" jurisdiction.'26 The legislative history shows, however,
that section 5 was not written merely to refer to "unfair competition"
because that was a well-established tort at common law, and Congress

124. The availability of appropriate relief has impacted substantive antitrust policy.
Whether price fixing actually occurred in a circumstantial evidence case is an issue
sometimes assisted by asking whether any meaningful injunctive relief can be imposed
upon the defendants. Oligopoly pricing that produces supracompetitive prices may be
unblockable because competitors cannot, and should not, be ordered to ignore each other
when setting prices. But the FTC or a court could order competitors to abandon a
noncollusive delivered pricing system if it produced similar price effects. Such a system is
enjoinable even if pure interdependent oligopolistic pricing is not. The FTC attempted
such an outcome in Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980), but the
Ninth Circuit refused to cooperate.
125. Averitt, supra note 83, at 234-35,271-75.
126. See ANTITRUST L. DEv., supra note 44, at 635, and cases cited.
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did not want the FTC's jurisdiction to be confined to the common law

tort. 127
In the context of section 75-1.1, Professor Aycock considered the
problem of common law unfair competition thirty years ago and
concluded that "practices heretofore deemed unfair competition
under the common law of North Carolina should now be a violation
of section 75-1.1 as an unfair method of competition."'" In his next
two paragraphs, however, Professor Aycock seemingly refined his
position, saying that common law unfair competition could also be
reached under the "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" prong of
section 75-1.1, and that perhaps this approach is preferable since this
prong "will protect competitors as well as consumers from such
practices."' 129 This suggestion, if implemented, would resolve the
problem noted above, that "unfair methods of competition" must
share its home base with non-antitrust matters.
The next question is, in addition to the common law tort of
unfair competition, what other conduct did Congress intend to be
covered by "unfair methods of competition?" Some amazingly broad
statements were made in congressional debate. 3 ° In addition, in FTC
v. Gratz,'131 the United States Supreme Court, although declining to
uphold the FTC's ruling, found that the words unfair methods of
127. Averitt describes the legislative process, saying that "[a]n amendment ... was
eventually adopted ... confirming that the Senate intended Section 5 to have a general
reach unconstrained by previous common law interpretations of 'unfair competition.'"
Averitt, supra note 83, at 235. The Supreme Court in FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643
(1931) also noted that "unfair methods of competition" was used by the drafters to include
conduct not reached by common law unfair competition. Id. at 648.
128. William B. Aycock, Antitrust and Unfair Trade PracticeLaw in North CarolinaFederalLaw Compared,50 N.C. L. REV. 199,250 (1972).
129. Id. at 251. Professor Aycock's reasoning is that the unfair/deceptive prong "is a
broader prohibition" than the unfair methods prong and that "judicial development in
North Carolina will probably be centered on it rather than on the more limited phrase."
Id. He reached these observations after noting that FTC Act section 5 was amended by
the Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938 to add the "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" phrase, and
that this amendment was prompted by the United States Supreme Court decision in
Raladam, which held "that proof of injury to competition was a jurisdictional prerequisite
to a proceeding charging 'unfair methods of competition.'" Id. at 250. Raladam was
actually a deceptive advertising case where respondent, producer of an "obesity cure" to
be taken internally, was alleged to have deceived the public by advertising that the cure
was safe and effective. The Supreme Court reversed the FTC not because it failed to show
an adverse effect on market competition, but because it failed to show injury to any
competitors or, indeed, that there were any competitors.
130. For example, Senator Newlands said: "The question is what unfair competition
covers. It covers every practice and method between competitors upon the part of one
against the other that is against public morals, ... or is an offense for which a remedy lies
either at law or in equity." 51 CONG. REc. 11,075, 11,112 (1914).
131. 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
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competition were "clearly inapplicable to practices never heretofore
regarded as opposed to good morals because characterized by
deception, bad faith, fraud or oppression, or as against public policy
because of their dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competition or
create monopoly.' ' 32
The negative implication obviously gives
"unfair methods" great, even unmanageable, breadth. Before 1938,
the FTC also used its unfair methods jurisdiction to challenge
deceptive practices where an adverse effect on a competitor could be
shown. 133 And the Court upheld the FTC in FTC v. R.F. Keppel &
Brother,Inc.," agreeing that the respondent had engaged in an unfair
method of competition 135 where Keppel's sales of "penny candy"
lured children into gambling. 136 "Penny candy" consisted of packages
that sold for a penny with some of them containing both candy and a
penny. 37 Averitt concludes that the 1914 version of section 5
authorized the FTC "to determine and enforce recognized standards
of fair competitive behavior, whether these have been declared by
statute or have emerged as the generally accepted ethical norms of
the community. This is primarily true (and perhaps exclusively true)
where violation of those standards confers a competitive
' 38
advantage.'
However, the 1938 broadening of section 5 to reach "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices" was a major change in the section 5
landscape. Generally, since that time, the FTC has not challenged
such "acts or practices" as unfair methods of competition but instead
has used its new authority. 139 As noted above, the Sperry &
Hutchinson case was a significant exception, but the FTC suffered a
defeat in the Supreme Court in that case.
In summary, the unfair methods prong of FTC Act section 5
today reaches conduct that violates the Sherman, Clayton, and
Robinson-Patman Acts plus antitrust-type conduct challenged by the
132. Id. at 427.
133. ANTITRUST L. DEV., supra note 44, at 616 (citing as an example FTC v. Winsted
Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922)).
134. 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
135. Id. at 313.
136. Id. at 308.
137. The Supreme Court in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchison, 405 U.S. 233, 242-43 (1972)
observed that since any competitor of Keppel's could have responded by adopting
Keppel's practice, the case involved no injury to a competitor of the sort that had been
required by the Court three years earlier in FTC v. Raladam, 283 U.S. 643 (1941).
138. Averitt, supra note 83, at 274.
139. Since 1938 the FTC "has prohibited a variety of marketing practices using variants
of the Keppel scheme, applying its authority to prohibit unfair practices." ANTITRUST L.
DEV., supra note 44, at 647.
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FTC on the basis of a showing of net anticompetitive effect. That the
FTC could conceivably withstand judicial review should it, as in
Keppel, challenge an unfair or deceptive practice as an unfair method
of competition, does not change the reality that the unfair methods
prong is applied by the FTC today as an antitrust statute.
D. The Unfair or Deceptive Acts or PracticesProng
In addition to the application of FTC Act section 5 to "unfair
methods of competition," after the Wheeler-Lea Amendments of
1938, the statute also reaches "unfair or deceptive acts or practices."
It is beyond the scope of this article to survey the extensive FTC law
on unfair and deceptive acts and practices, and useful surveys of this
law exist elsewhere. 14° A point relevant to this discussion, though, is
that with the publication in 1964 of its "cigarette labeling rule," the
FTC commenced the process of differentiating between unfair41
practices, on the one hand, and deceptive practices, on the other.1
The cigarette labeling rule articulated a three-pronged standard for
unfair acts and practices. That standard was followed in 1980 with the
issuance of a "policy statement" defining unfair practices, which in
turn was codified by the FTC Act Amendments of 1994.142 The
statute provides that an unfair act or practice is one that "causes or is
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers, which is not
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed
by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.' ' 43 In
1983, the Commission also issued a policy statement indicating that a
deceptive practice would be found "if there is a misrepresentation,
omission, or other practice, that misleads the consumer acting
reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment."'"
IV. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN SECTION 75-1.1, ANTITRUST LAW,
THE FTC ACT, AND BUSINESS TORTS
Proper articulation of the concern of this paper-that
competitive conduct that benefits consumers may be penalized by
section 75-1.1 liability-requires brief reference to the relationship of

140. E.g., ANTITRUST L. DEv., supra note 44, at 616-52 (surveying the application of
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act as consumer protection law).
141. Id. at 616.
142. Id. at 647-49.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2000).
144. Policy Statement on Deception, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,205 at 20,917
(F.T.C.Apr. 23, 1997).
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business or commercial torts both to antitrust law and to section 751.1. Three points should be made.
First, state common law and statutory commercial or "business"
torts are not themselves antitrust violations, but in some cases they
may constitute components of antitrust violations. 14 5 As noted
earlier, business torts do not alone achieve antitrust scope because
proof of such claims generally requires no showing of an adverse
effect on market competition. Conduct that is illegal as a matter of
state common law or statutory tort law, however, may in some cases
be used by antitrust plaintiffs to satisfy the requirement that
predatory conduct be shown to establish the offenses of
monopolization and attempt to monopolize. 146 Tort conduct, in some
cases, may also be relevant to section 1 Sherman Act claims. For
example, in Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Michell Woodbury Corp.,'47 a
1932 First Circuit decision, the court held that a "conspiracy ... the
purpose or intent of which is by unfair means to eliminate a
competitor" was a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
In many decisions over seventy years thereafter, the First Circuit and
most other courts decided instead that such activity should be tested
under the rule of reason.148
Second, conduct that is a business tort can also be a violation of
FTC Act section 5.149 Moreover, and more importantly, it seems that
virtually all North Carolina business torts are found also to violate
section 75-1.1.15o Successful business tort plaintiffs may frequently be
able to collect not only compensatory damages but also punitive
damages. Business tort plaintiffs who also show violations of section
75-1.1 can, as noted above, collect treble damages automatically and
may be able to obtain attorney fees.
Third, during the period 1960-1990, tort claims nationally were
more frequently asserted in antitrust cases than had been true before;
damage recoveries on tort claims in some cases dwarfed antitrust
145. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 122, at 271-87, 344-59; Monty Gray &
Robert Homchick, The Evolving Role of Business Torts in Antitrust Litigation, in
BUSINEss TORTS & UNFAIR COMPETITION: A PRACTITIONER'S HANDBOOK 3,3-14 (A.

Michael Ferrill ed., 1996); ANTITRUST L. DEV., supranote 44, at 125-27.
146. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 122, at 257-73, 327-41, deals with this
analysis at great length.
147. 57 F.2d 96, 102 (1st Cir. 1932).
148. ANTITRUST L. DEv., supra note 44, at 125-27.
149. Id. at 635.
150. See ALLEN, supra note 2, at 410-11, 415-17, 535, 539-50, 555-62; Robert W.
Spearman & Jill B. Hickey, Unfair Trade Practice Litigation Under N.C. General Statute
Section 75-1.1 12-17 (December 1995) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
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damage recoveries; and in many cases the tort claims were successful
while the antitrust claims failed.
Most frequently cited in this
context is Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco

Disposal,Inc.,52 in which Kelco sued Browning-Ferris, a competitor
in the waste disposal business, for conduct that drove it out of

business." 3 The jury awarded Kelco $51,146 in compensatory
damages both on its antitrust and its tort claims. 54 The jury also
awarded $6 million in punitive damages on the tort claim 55 while the
antitrust claim was merely trebled. Predictably, the plaintiff elected
to recover on the tort claim. 56
V. FAILURES IN APPLICATION OF SECTION
FEDERAL COURTS

75-1.1 BY STATE AND

The focus now shifts to judicial interpretation of North
Carolina's section 75-1.1, with the objective of determining the extent

to which (1) the basis for section 75-1.1 recovery has been clearly
identified and (2) section 75-1.1 recoveries have resulted from
application of a reduced, watered down or "low test" antitrust
standard. It is hard to avoid the observation that judicial application
of section 75-1.1 has been inadequate, unclear, and confusing.157
While some of the confusion is inconsequential in the sense that the

outcome in the case was probably not affected, in other cases the
analysis, and sometimes the outcome, was affected. Failure to
identify the prong, or identifying the "wrong" prong, of section 75-1.1
forming the basis for the decision has affected both analysis and
outcome in some cases. Such failures have contributed to inadequate

151. See Gray & Homchick, supra note 145, at 13-14; Harvey I. Saferstein, The
Ascendancy of Business Tort Claims in Antitrust Practice,59 ANTITRUST L.J. 379, 384-85
(1991).
152. 492 U.S. 257 (1989). Other cases involving greater plaintiff returns on the tort, as
opposed to the antitrust, claim include: Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. OXY USA,
Inc., 44 F.3d 1465 (10th Cir. 1995); ColoradoInterstateGas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.
of America, 885 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1989); FirstComics, Inc. v. World ColorPress, Inc., 884
F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1989); Deauville Corp. v. FederatedDepartment Stores, Inc., 756 F.2d
1183 (5th Cir. 1985); Automotive ElectricService Corp. v. Ass'n of Automotive Aftermarket
Distributors,Motor Age, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
153. Saferstein, supra note 151, at 379.
154. Browning-Ferris,492 U.S. at 262.
155. Id.
156. Saferstein, supra note 151, at 380.
157. An important disclaimer is that this review is based on a sampling of section 75-1.1
cases. Although all section 75-1.1 decisions have not been scrutinized, it is believed that
the bulk of the section 75-1.1 decisions involving antitrust issues have been reviewed.
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antitrust analysis in some section 75-1.1 cases having antitrust
character. 15s
A.

Failureto Specify the ProngFormingthe Basis of the Ruling

The first observation that results from a review of the cases is
that the courts have frequently failed to specify the prong or
component of section 75-1.1 upon which the decision is based. In the
cases discussed in this section, however, the prong identification
failure was seemingly harmless in the sense that neither outcome nor
analysis were affected.
In the first decision holding that the insurance code did not
preclude private suits involving insurance practices pursuant to
section 75-1.1, Ray v. United Family Life Insurance Co.,15 9 the court
dealt with claims by an insurance agent that its "burial insurance"
agency was terminated because it refused to agree to an exclusive
arrangement. 60 The court noted the plaintiff's evidence showing that
the defendant insurer had acquired "a commanding share of the
market for burial insurance in North Carolina,' ' 16' and that it intended
"to exclude competition completely in the burial insurance industry in
North Carolina"" by acquiring other insurers and their agents and
insisting on exclusive agency arrangements. 63 The court denied the
summary judgment motion directed at the section 75-1.1 claim and at
the Sherman Act section 2 claim, but it granted the motion based on
section 1 of the Sherman Act for failure of the plaintiff to produce
evidence of a combination or conspiracy." In short, the court dealt
with antitrust claims that should have been treated under the "unfair
methods of competition" prong of section 75-1.1. The court spoke of
section 75-1.1, however, and all of its prongs together without
specifying the applicable one. 6 5
Similarly, in Ellis v. Smith-Broadhurst, Inc.,166 another case
applying section 75-1.1 in an insurance context, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals reversed a grant of summary judgment for the
defendant, 67 where the plaintiff agent claimed the defendant, also an
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See infra notes 229-56 and accompanying text.
430 F. Supp. 1353 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
Id. at 1354.
Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1355.
Id. at 1355-56.
Id. at 1359.
Id. at 1356-57.
48 N.C. App. 180, 268 S.E.2d 271 (1980).
Id. at 184,268 S.E.2d at 274.
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agent, misrepresented the terms and costs of the plaintiff's policy. 6 '
Without identifying the section 75-1.1 prong, the court stated simply
that section 75-1.1 "provides a remedy for unfair trade practices in the
insurance industry."'16 9
In Stearns v. Genrad,17 ° a terminated distributor alleged
violations of sections 1171 and 2172 of the Sherman Act, section 3 of the
Clayton Act 173 and of sections 75-1, 75-5(b)(2) and (3), since repealed,
and section 75-1.1.1 4 Plaintiff claimed that it was terminated by the
manufacturer for its failure to agree to an exclusive dealing
arrangement, 7 5 to accept defendant's "full line forcing" of products,176
to adhere to defendant's specified resale prices, 77 and to abide by
territorial and customer allocations. 78 In granting the defendant's
summary judgment motions, 7 9 the court assessed the Sherman Act
and Clayton Act claims under the rule of reason 8 ° and disposed of
most of them for plaintiff's failure to show an adverse effect on
market competition.'
The court dismissed the North Carolina
claims for the same reasons, referring simply to section 75-1.1 without
2
specifying which prong of the statute was applicable.'8
In Drouillard v. Keister Williams Newspaper Services, Inc.,183
defendant Lindsay Publishing counterclaimed that Drouillard
violated the Trade Secrets Protection Act' 14 by taking "customer lists
and pricing and bidding formulas" when he left Lindsay's employ and
using them to enable his new employer to best Lindsay in bidding for
the Byrd Food Stores account.' 5 Affirming a treble-damage verdict
168. Id. at 181,268 S.E.2d at 272.
169. Id. at 183, 268 S.E.2d at 273. The court had made earlier reference to defendant's
claim that "plaintiff cannot recover damages under 75-1.1 because unfair and deceptive
acts and practices in the insurance industry are regulated exclusively by the insurance
statutes." Id. at 182, 268 S.E.2d at 273.
170. 564 F. Supp. 1309 (M.D.N.C. 1983), affjd on other grounds, 752 F.2d 942 (4th Cir.
1984).
171. Id. at 1312.
172. Id. at 1317-18.
173. Id. at 1316-17.
174. Id. at 1318.
175. Id. at 1313.
176. Id. at 1314.
177. Id. at 1315.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1311.
180. Id. at 1312-13.
181. Id. at 1314-15.
182. Id. at 1318.
183. 108 N.C. App. 169, 423 S.E.2d 324 (1992).
184. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152 to 66-162 (2001).
185. Id. at 172, 423 S.E.2d at 326.
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on the counterclaim, the court, without further clarification, rejected
the plaintiff's argument that violations of the Trade Secrets
Protection Act were not "unfair or deceptive acts or practices under"
section 75-1.1.186 The court stated that section 75-1.1 "should not be
so narrowly construed" and that it "declares '[u]nfair methods of
competition' ... to be unlawful." 1" One is left unsure whether the
conduct was deemed an unfair or deceptive act or an unfair method
of competition.
Likewise, in Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc.,188 plaintiff, the
"well-known fashion house selling clothing for men and women"
using "RALPH LAUREN" and other trademarks, sued defendant
for selling sport shirts bearing the embroidered symbol of a "polo
player mounted on a horse." 189 The court affirmed summary
judgment for the plaintiff for Lanham Act, common law unfair
competition, and section 75-1.1 claims. In dealing with section 75-1.1,
the court said that unfair methods of competition "encompass any
conduct that a court of equity would consider unfair" and that a
"practice is unfair if it is unethical or unscrupulous, and it is deceptive
if it has a tendency to deceive." 190 The court failed to indicate which
prong of section 75-1.1 it intended to invoke.
The court also kept us in the dark in American Craft Hosiery
9 1 Plaintiff American and
Corp. v. Damascus Hosiery Mills, Inc.1
defendant Damascus bid against each other on a government contract
to supply "1,922,000 pairs of olive green cushion sole army socks."
American had a deal with Setzer that it would "do the knitting of the
griege goods."' 92 The problem was that Damascus had been Setzer's
only customer and owned one-half of Setzer's knitting machines. So,
when American won the bid and Setzer's involvement became
known, a vice president of Damascus announced that if Setzer stuck
with the deal with American, Damascus would "put him out of
business."1 93 As a result of this announcement, Setzer backed out of
the deal with American, and the jury returned a verdict for American
on its tortious interference claim. Acknowledging that "a reading of
all the cases" indicated that "tortious interference with a contract

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Drouillard,108 N.C. App. at 172-74,423 S.E.2d at 326-27.
Id. at 172,423 S.E.2d at 326.
816 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 147.
Id. at 148.
575 F. Supp. 816 (W.D.N.C. 1983).
Id. at 820.

193. Id.
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could constitute an unfair method of competition or unfair acts within
the meaning of the statute," the court, without explanation, held that
"the facts of this case do not constitute such unfair competition, and
the unfair acts and practices made unlawful by the Act.1 94 The court
declined to explain its decision and it declined to tell us upon which
prong of the statute its nonreasoning was based.
B.

CasesApplying the Wrong Section 75-1.1 Prong to the Conduct at
Issue

The first category of cases, just discussed, involved those in which
the court simply failed to identify the section 75-1.1 prong on which it
relied. This second category, the "wrong prong" cases, involves those
in which the court identified the prong, but chose the wrong one.
1. Cases with Antitrust "Character" Treated under the
Unfair/Deceptive Prong
In a case involving a municipally-owned cable television
service, the court stated that "monopolies" may "constitute ...
'[u]nfair methods of competition' or 'unfair or deceptive acts or
practices.' "195 Passing by the fact that monopolies, as opposed to
monopolization, are not illegal under any prong of any statute, 96 the
court correctly noted that the unfair methods prong is pertinent to
illegal monopolies but went astray in stating that they are reached by
the unfair/deceptive prong.19
Given that the dominant practitioner and judicial view of section
75-1.1 has it as an "unfair trade practices" statute, it is not surprising
that most of the mischaracterizations involve mislabeling antitrust
claims as "unfair trade practices" or as "unfair and deceptive
acts/practices." Dull v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. 19 is an
example. In Dull, the plaintiffs, terminated insurance agents, forced
antitrust analysis upon the court by relying on the Brown Shoe case, 199
where the FTC found that Brown Shoe's exclusive dealing
arrangements with its dealers restricted its competitors' access to the
194. Id. at 821.
195. Madison Cablevision v. City of Morganton, 325 N.C. 634, 655, 386 S.E.2d 200,212
(1989).
196. "While merely possessing monopoly power is not itself an antitrust violation ....
it
is a necessary element of a monopolization charge." United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34,51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
197. That is not to say that a monopolist could never be found to have committed an
unfair or a deceptive act or practice.
198. 85 N.C. App. 310,354 S.E.2d 752 (1987).
199. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
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market.2 0 The Supreme Court's incipiency analysis in Brown Shoe is
out of fashion today, but it still qualifies as antitrust analysis. That
should have caused the Dull court, in affirming summary judgment
for defendant, to rely on the "unfair methods" prong of section 75-1.1
rather than the unfair/deceptive prong.
McDaniel v. Greensboro News Co. 1 was indisputably an
antitrust case in which the plaintiff newspaper distributor claimed
that it was terminated in part for refusing to adhere to maximum
resale prices. 2 The court denied defendants' summary judgment
motions addressed to the plaintiff's section 1 Sherman Act claims and
its section 75-1, 75-2, and 75-1.1 claims. It treated the section 75-1 and
75-2 claims simultaneously with the Sherman section 1 claim203 but
turned to separate analysis for the section 75-1.1 claim. For this
separate analysis, it offered the definition of an "unfair practice" and
announced that the "claim of unfair and deceptive trade practice also
survives defendants' motion."2" The court should also have treated
the section 75-1.1 claim simultaneously with the Sherman Act claim
"just as it treated the section 75-1 and 75-2 claims." If the court
wished to separate the claim out, it should have spoken of an unfair
method of competition claim rather than an unfair or deceptive trade
practice.
In Owens v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.,205 the North Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed denial of defendant's summary judgment
motion where the plaintiff, a convenience store operator, claimed that
defendant "severely limited" his supply of two-liter containers of
Pepsi to force him to raise his resale prices."° Although the claim was
grounded in facts potentially indicating a per se violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act, the court made no reference to the unfair
methods prong of section 75-1.1. Indeed, it made no reference to the
unfair/deceptive prong but instead referred to "coercive business

200. Id. at 317.
201. 1984-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 65,792, at 67,277 (M.D.N.C. 1983).
202. Id. at 67,278. This decision occurred before State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997),
when maximum resale price maintenance was still illegal per se under Sherman Act
section 1. See supra note 60.
203. "Summary judgment is not appropriate as to plaintiff's price fixing claims brought
under section 1 of the Sherman Act and N.C. Gen. Stat. sections 75-1 & -2." McDaniel,
1984-1 Trade Cases (CCH) at 67,279.
204. Id.
205. 330 N.C. 666,412 S.E.2d 636 (1992).
206. Id. at 676,412 S.E.2d at 642.
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tactics" and "inequitable assertions of power" as violating "our unfair

practices law."

7

2. Cases Having No Antitrust "Character" Treated Under the Unfair
Methods Prong
From cases "sounding in" antitrust or having some antitrust
dimension with the court improperly invoking the unfair/deceptive
prong rather than the unfair methods prong, attention now turns to
cases having no antitrust character but where the court invoked the
unfair methods prong.
But for the court's final saving phrase, United Laboratories,Inc.
v. KuykendalF0 involved an extreme case of the court's inability to
decide which prong of section 75-1.1 to apply. Kuykendall left his
employment with United and went to work for Share, which
competed with United in the sale of chemicals. 20 9 The jury returned a
verdict for United, finding that both Share and Kuykendall violated
Kuykendall's covenant not to compete, that Share induced
Kuykendall to leave United and solicit his former customers, and
Share offered to pay legal fees and costs associated with any lawsuit
brought by United.2 10 The court affirmed the section 75-1.1 trebledamage verdict in the amount of $45,000.211 Its discussion consisted
first of a mini-treatise about unfair and deceptive acts or practices,
noting that the statute protects "business persons," including
competitors, as well as consumers. The court went on to explain that
whether a practice is unfair or deceptive depends on the facts and the
"impact the practice has on the marketplace" and that the court
applies the law after the jury finds the facts. 1 2 The court then turned
to "unfair methods of competition," saying that they, too, are to be
judged by the facts and their "actual effects upon others.2 1 Then,
207. Id. at 676-77, 412 S.E.2d at 642-43. Unlike the common practice of the North
Carolina courts to refer to section 75-1.1 as an "unfair trade practice" law, Chief Justice
Exum, the author of this opinion, referred to section 75-1.1 as an "unfair practice" statute.
This was also his style in HAJMM Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 328 N.C. 578, 592,
403 S.E.2d 483, 492 (1991), and United Laboratories., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 335 N.C. 183,
190, 437 S.E.2d 374, 378 (1993). The practice has the merit of emphasizing that the statute
specifies an offense of "unfair practices," a specification that is not always clearly intended
by those who use the term "unfair trade practices."
208. 102 N.C. App. 484, 403 S.E.2d 104 (1991), affd, 335 N.C. 183, 437 S.E.2d 374
(1993).
209. Id. at 489-92,403 S.E.2d at 107-09.
210. Id. at 491-92,403 S.E.2d at 109.
211. Id. at 492, 403 S.E.2d at 109.
212. Id. at 490-91,403 S.E.2d at 109.
213. Id. at 491.403 S.E.2d at 109.
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wiping away all of these distinctions, the court concluded, "We agree
with the trial court's finding that Share's conduct violated G.S.
Chapter 75."1 214 Not wanting to leave us completely in the dark,
however, the court then said that the "facts constituted unfair
methods of competition, "215 an inexplicable final comment given the
non-antitrust character of the facts and claims.
In CF Industries,Inc. v. TranscontinentalGas Pipe Line Corp.,216
the plaintiff, an agricultural co-op, claimed that defendant,
Transcontinental, induced it to build a fertilizer plant promising that
it would provide an adequate supply of natural gas to the plant when,
in fact, it failed to do so. 217 The plaintiff claimed the defendant
committed an "unfair practice. 21 8 The court dismissed the claim,
noting that it "threaten[ed] to make every intentional breach of a
commercial contract an unfair trade practice subjecting the breaching
party to treble damages. 2 19 However, the court also said that the
claim "carrie[d] no suggestion of deception, no allegation of any anticompetitive effect, no charge that Transco's purpose was to injure
plaintiffs' business," and that "without any suggestion of deception or
any claim of injury to competition, plaintiffs have not stated a claim
under section 75-1.12 ' ° The court's references to deception are
curious since the plaintiff had claimed only an "unfair practice," and
its references to anticompetitive effect and injury to competition are
inexplicable because the case contained no antitrust earmarks, and
the plaintiff apparently had not invoked the unfair methods prong of
section 75-1.1.
In a quarrel between two manufacturers of tobacco harvesting
equipment, curing racks, and barns,1' the court affirmed the grant of
defendant Powell's motion for summary judgment finding its
advertising claim that it had "the exclusive CutterBar" was not false
or misleading.'m In addition, the court found that its claim that "only
the Powell Combine primes lugs through tips" was mere puffing. 2
The court said the CutterBar ad was "not an unfair method of
competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice" and the Powell
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 492,403 S.E.2d at 110.
Id.
448 F. Supp. 475 (W.D.N.C. 1978).
Id. at 483.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 485.
Id.
Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 38 N.C. App. 393,248 S.E.2d 739 (1978).
Id. at 400,248 S.E.2d at 743-44.
Id. at 400-401,248 S.E.2d at 744.
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Combine advertising claim "did not constitute unfair competition or
an unfair or deceptive act." 4 The court needlessly and confusingly
ruled on the unfair methods prong in a non-antitrust case.225 Turning
to Powell's complaint about Harrington's advertising, the court again
found only puffing but confined its ruling to the statement that it was
not an unfair act.226
The more relevant part of the case for this discussion is the
court's ruling that Harrington's advertisement and demonstration of
Powell's equipment as its own stated a claim for unfair methods of
competition. The court reached this outcome by concluding (1) that
although Harrington's conduct was not "passing off" as it "has
traditionally been applied,"' it was close enough and (2) that passing
off is unfair competition. 2 Its third, albeit unstated proposition, is
that unfair competition is an unfair method of competition. The
bottom line is that the court treated non-antitrust conduct as an
unfair method of competition. The history of section 75-1.1 and FTC
Act section 5 show, however, that indeed Congress in 1914 thought its
"unfair method of competition" language would include "unfair
competition." Professor Aycock's 1972 suggestion that, in effect,
unfair competition be shifted from the unfair methods to the
unfair/deceptive prong of section 75-1.1 was not considered by the
Harringtoncourt. It is understandable that the history of the statute
may cause courts applying section 75-1.1 to treat "unfair competition"
claims as "unfair methods of competition." But other cases discussed
in this section show that courts treat non-antitrust claims as unfair
methods of competition even when no such historical circumstances
warrant.
C. Failureto Identify Prongor ErroneousIdentificationof Prong
ProducingFaultyAnalysis or Improper Outcome
Unlike the cases (or parts of cases) discussed above, where the
lack of clarity was harmless, in some decisions the failure of the court
to identify the pertinent section 75-1.1 prong produced an improper
224. Id.
225. Presumably, although again confusingly, its reference to "unfair competition" was
shorthand for "unfair method of competition." Id. at 401, 248 S.E.2d at 744.
226. Id. at 403, 248 S.E.2d at 745. Although there is confusion here, the court may not
at this point refer to unfair methods because Powell apparently claimed only that the
Harrington ads were "unfair and deceptive acts." Still, although the court referred only to
"unfair acts," its reasoning--"buyers [would] not easily have been misled"-indicated the
real issue was whether the ads were deceptive, not whether they were unfair. See id.
227. Id. at 405, 248 S.E.2d at 746.
228. Id. at 404,248 S.E.2d at 746.
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outcome or error. For example, in Sea-Roy v. Parts R Parts,Inc., 9
the plaintiff had been an exclusive agent for the distribution of
Rammax trench compaction rollers and a purchaser of Farymann
engine parts from Farymann's distributor, PRP. 11 Among other
things, the plaintiff complained that it was terminated by Rammax
and that others conspired to prevent it from purchasing engines and
engine parts directly from Farymann or PRP.2 1 With inadequate
evidence of conspiratorial action, the court found no violation of
Sherman Act section 1 and held that even if the plaintiff had proved a
conspiracy, it still had no Sherman Act claim because it had failed to
prove an adverse effect on market competition, which rule of reason
analysis requires.?3
The court dealt with the state antitrust and section 75-1.1 claims
in a footnote2 33 It dismissed the section 75-1 claim "for the same
reasons" it dismissed the Sherman Act claim.'
Turning to the
section 75-1.1 claim, however, the court noted that the statute
"forbids unfair methods of competition or unfair and deceptive trade
practice[s]," and that these claims would be dismissed "due to
Plaintiffs' failure to establish (1) an adverse effect on competition, or
(2) actual injury or damage to themselves." 5 The court concluded by
stating that the evidence consisted only of "speculative theories of
recovery," not facts which would show that defendants "engaged in
unfair or deceptive trade practices."' 6
The court began by referring to "unfair methods of competition"
but ended by saying there was no showing of "unfair or deceptive
trade practices." 7 That was only the beginning of the confusion.
The court further failed to take note that any claim of an "unfair
method of competition" would have been identical to the Sherman
Act section 1 and the North Carolina 75-1 claims. The court should
have dismissed both the 75-1 claim and the "unfair methods" claim
for the same reasons it dismissed the Sherman Act claim. Finally, the
court confusingly required proof of an adverse effect on market

229. 1998-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 72,155, at 81,980 (M.D.N.C. 1997), aff'dper curiam,
No. 98-1028,1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3383 (4th Cir. Mar. 4,1999).
230. Id. at 81,981-82.
231. Id. at 81,982-83.
232. Id. at 81,990-94.
233. Id. at 81,994 n.25.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.

1966

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

competition for an "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" claim.S
While such a showing should be required for an "unfair methods"
claim, there is no basis for imposing such a requirement in an
"unfair/deceptive" case. Clearer identification of the relevant prongs
of section 75-1.1 would have materially assisted the court's analysis.
The same can be said of Cameron v. New Hanover Memorial
Hospital,39 where the court sustained directed verdicts for defendants
against claims by two podiatrists that two orthopedic surgeons on
staff conspired with the New Hanover Memorial Hospital to deny
staff privileges to the plaintiffs 4
The court found insufficient
evidence of conspiratorial action to support the plaintiffs' claims of
"civil conspiracy," tortious interference with contract and prospective
advantage, or their section 75-1 claim. 241 At the same time, the
court's recitation of the evidence indicated that defendants were
generally well aware of the actions and statements of each other in
opposing the plaintiffs' petitions for staff privileges.2 42 In dealing with
the section 75-1.1 claim, instead of upholding the lower court for the
same reason it applied to the other claims, the court held, pursuant to
the 1977 State ex rel. Edmisten v. J. C. Penney Co. decision, 243 that the
defendants' conduct did not involve the "bargain, sale, barter,
exchange or traffic" in goods.2' Had the court isolated the unfair
methods prong as the appropriate one, it might properly have treated
the section 75-1.1 and 75-1 claims identically.
As noted earlier, in tracking section 5 of the FTC Act, the unfair
methods prong of section 75-1.1 is merely an antitrust statute
incorporating state analogs to Sherman Act sections 1 and 2.245 At
the time of Cameron, this would only have been 75-1.246 While the
FTC has stretched section 5 to cover certain conduct not covered by

238. Id.
239. 58 N.C. App. 414,293 S.E.2d 901 (1982).
240. Id. at 453, 293 S.E.2d at 924.
241. Id. at 438-43,293 S.E.2d at 916-18.
242. Id. at 422-30,293 S.E.2d at 906-11.
243. 292 N.C. 311,316-17,233 S.E.2d 895,899 (1977).
244. Cameron, 58 N.C. App. at 444-45, 293 S.E.2d at 919. The court also noted, in the
alternative, that if it were to apply the revised version of section 75-1.1, which legislatively
reversed Penney, it would hold that the "learned profession" exemption was applicable.
Id. at 445-47,293 S.E.2d at 920-21.
245. See supranotes 13-44,56-124 and accompanying text.
246. The North Carolina analog to section 2 of the Sherman Act, section 75-2.1, was
not enacted until 1996. Act of June 3, 1996, ch. 550, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 11 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-2.1 (2000)).
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the Sherman or Clayton Acts, there was no valid argument that any
247
such stretching of section 75-1.1 should have occurred in Cameron.
The question that the court of appeals might have asked was
whether, despite the lack of evidence of a conspiracy between the
hospital and the two orthopedists, it might nevertheless have found
an unfair method of competition arising from their nonconspiratorial,
but knowing, actions. The court dutifully observed that given section
75-1.1's similarity to FTC Act section 5, cases under the latter are
"instructive" to courts applying the former.248 Had the court taken
full note of relevant section 5 cases, it might have rejected such a
nonconspiratorial approach to section 75-1.1. It could have come to
that position on the basis of the 1980 decision, just two years before
Cameron, in Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 49 in which the Ninth
Circuit reversed the FTC for ordering termination of an industrydelivered pricing system where there was no evidence of collusion.2
In short, the court in Cameron, although reaching the right result,
erred in its application of section 75-1.1.
The decision in Telephone Services, Inc. v. General Telephone
Co. of the South21' consisted of a summary statement ("We hold that
it is not unfair for defendant to refuse to employ its competitor."),
rather than a reasoned conclusion.m2 Where defendant declined to
use the plaintiff's installation and repair services because it was a
competitor in the sale of "customer premise equipment," the case
involved a unilateral refusal to deal-a federal antitrust category
bulging with decisions." Although it invoked the United States v.
Colgate & Co. rule254 for its decision, the court failed to take note of
247. The analysis here makes no attempt to assess the propriety of the court's
application of the then-current Penney limitation of 75-1.1 to goods or of the learned
profession exception, and it is not necessarily intended to suggest that the court erred in
applying these principles.
248. Cameron, 58 N.C. App. at 443-44,293 S.E.2d at 919.
249. 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980).
250. Id. at 581-82. The FTC's "invitations to collude" consent decrees were not
available as a model for section 75-1.1 since they were entered ten years after Cameron.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text. Moreover, the "easy" stretching of section 5 to
cover nonconspiratorial conduct represented by those proceedings is clearly inapplicable
to the Cameron facts.
251. 92 N.C. App. 90,373 S.E.2d 440 (1988).
252. Id. at 94,373 S.E.2d at 443.
253. The cases are collected in ANTITRUST L. DEV., supranote 44, at 273-86.
254. In United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), the Court declared that one
may deal, or not, with whomever one wishes absent "any purpose to create or maintain a
monopoly." Id at 307. The question was whether the indictment adequately alleged that
Colgate, a manufacturer of soap and toilet articles, had entered into agreements with
dealers that required them to resell the products at certain minimum prices. The case has
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or distinguish two major United States Supreme Court decisions
finding federal antitrust violations in the context of unilateral refusals
to deal2 55 Clear identification of the case as belonging under the
unfair methods rather than the unfair/deceptive prong of section 751.1 might have led to fuller consideration of relevant antitrust
authorities. Happily, the result seems not to have been affected since
the plaintiff apparently offered no evidence that the defendant
enjoyed monopoly power or that its refusal created the dangerous
probability of its acquiring such power. 6
In Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Goel 57 the failure to distinguish
between the antitrust component of section 75-1.1 and the other parts
of the statute affected the court's analysis. The defendant, Goel, was
moving his employment from Reichhold to a consulting arrangement
with Imperial. 8 Reichhold was a producer of reactive polyurethane
adhesives, and Imperial hoped to enter some part of that business.5 9
Goel, while continuing to work for Reichhold, "met or exceeded his
projected goals."26° At the same time, he commenced work for
Imperial pursuant to a consulting agreement scheduled to become
effective when he terminated employment at Reichhold. 61 A
secretary at Imperial told Reichhold about Goel's appearances at
Imperial.2 62 Reichhold sued Imperial, Imperial abandoned the
consulting agreement, and Goel counterclaimed that Reichhold's first
lawsuit was tortious interference with the consulting agreement and
an "unfair trade practice" under section 75-1.1.263
Reichhold
defended against the counterclaims with the argument that the

become known, however, for the general rule that a firm is free to decide unilaterallywith
whom it will deal.
255. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (finding a
violation where petitioner ski resort refused to participate with its competitor in a multimountain ski ticket venture where consumers were adversely affected); Lorain Journal
Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (holding that the Journal violated section 2 of the
Sherman Act by refusing to sell advertising space to persons who placed ads with a
competing radio station).
256. For the components of the monopolization and attempted monopolization
antitrust offenses, see supra note 106.
257. 146 N.C. App. 137,555 S.E.2d 281 (2001).
258. Id. at 142, 555 S.E.2d at 284-85.
259. Id. at 142-43, 555 S.E.2d at 284-85.
260. Id. at 143, 555 S.E.2d at 285. The goods related to employment in plaintiff's
automobile adhesives unit to which Goel had been transferred, a move which he and
plaintiff considered to be a demotion. Id. at 142-43,555 S.E.2d at 285.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 143, 555 S.E.2d at 285.
263. Id. at 144-45, 156,555 S.E.2d at 286-87,293.
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"Noerr-Pennington doctrine," adopted in a federal antitrust context,
protected its right to bring the first suit."6
The court rejected Reichhold's efforts to defend the tortious
interference claim with the Noerr-Pennington doctrine but allowed
Reichhold to use it to defeat Goel's section 75-1.1 claim.265 Noting
that "Chapter 75 of the North Carolina General Statutes was
modeled after that federal antitrust law, and that federal decisions
may 'provide guidance in determining the scope and meaning of
chapter 75,' '266 the court held "that the reasoning of Noerr and PRE
apply to N.C.G.S. section 75-1.1 "1267 However, seeing "no relation
between ...tortious interference and the legislative intent behind
federal antitrust law," the court declined to allow the NoerrPenningtondefense in response to the tortious interference claim.268
The court failed to clearly identify the section 75-1.1 prong upon
which Goel depended. It referred to "Chapter 75," "unfair trade
practices," and "unfair and deceptive trade practices," but not to
"unfair methods of competition. 2 69 The court's failure to identify the
relevant prong of section 75-1.1 led it to apply the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, a federal antitrust doctrine, to the entirety of section 75-1.1,
rather than limiting it-or to consider limiting it-to the antitrust part
of section 75-1.1, that is, the "unfair methods" prong. Indeed, to the
extent that Goel's section 75-1.1 counterclaim was not an antitrust
claim, by the court's reasoning in rejecting Noerr-Pennington
application to the tortious interference claim, it should also have
rejected its application to the section 75-1.1 claim.270
264. Id. at 146-47, 156-57, 555 S.E.2d at 287, 293. The doctrine is named for the two
decisions that created it, Eastern RailroadPresidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657 (1965). The doctrine stands for the proposition that "the federal antitrust laws ... do
not regulate the conduct of private individuals in seeking anticompetitive action from the
government." City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. 365,379-80 (1991). It
has been held to protect the filing of a lawsuit unless it is deemed to be "sham litigation,"
which will not be true unless (1) "the lawsuit [is] ...objectively baseless in the sense that
no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits;" (2) the litigant was
"indifferent to the outcome on the merits" of the lawsuit; (3) any damages to be obtained
would not justify the "investment in the suit;" and/or (4) the suit was brought "primarily
for the benefit of collateral injuries inflicted through the use of legal process." Prof'l Real
Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S.49, 60-65 (1993).
265. 146 N.C. App. at 148, 156-57,555 S.E.2d at 288,293.
266. Id. at 156, 555 S.E.2d at 293.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 148, 555 S.E.2d at 288.
269. Id. at 156-57,555 S.E.2d at 293.
270. Other courts have recognized and allowed the Noerr-Pennington defense in
business tort cases. See generally Pamela Hobbs, Application of Antitrust Principles to
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Failure to identify the pertinent prong also led to judicial error in
American Rockwool, Inc. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,271 a
product disparagement case. The court rejected the defendant's
claim that the plaintiff was required to show an adverse effect on
competition. 272 Again, the court failed to identify the section 75-1.1
prong, simply referring to the statute as "section 75-1.1.1273 It
properly rejected defendant's argument since the case involved
unfair/deceptive claims as opposed to antitrust/competition claims.
But the court's failure to break the statute into its parts resulted in a
broad and faulty announcement that a plaintiff in a section 75-1.1 case
never needs to show an adverse effect on market competition.274
VI. ADVERSE IMPACT ON CONSUMER WELFARE THREATENED BY
OVERBROAD APPLICATION OF SEcTION 75-1.1

The review of cases in Part V produced three types of decisions:
(1) where the court harmlessly failed to specify any prong or
component of section 75-1.1 as the basis for its ruling; (2) where the
court identified the wrong prong as the appropriate one; and (3)
where improper prong identification affected the court's analysis or
the outcome of the case. A fourth category of cases, now examined,
consists of two subparts. Plaintiffs in the first group of cases urge,
although unsuccessfully, that section 75-1.1 reaches conduct not
invalidated by federal or state antitrust law. More importantly, Part
VI(A) also identifies a second group of cases where the court rejected
antitrust claims but upheld section 75-1.1 claims. The potential for
section 75-1.1 to serve inappropriately as a method for unsuccessful
antitrust claimants to obtain treble damages and attorney fees
represents a serious problem for application of the statute. Part
VI(B) suggests methods for applying section 75-1.1 to minimize its
potential to harm consumer interests.

Business Tort Claims, in BUSINESS TORTS & UNFAIR COMPETITION: A PRACrmTIONER'S
HANDBOOK 15, 27-28 (A. Michael Ferrill ed., 1996) (examining how defendants in
business tort cases have borrowed defenses from antitrust cases).
271. 640 F. Supp. 1411 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
272. Id. at 1434.
273. Id.
274. This case is discussed at greater length, infra notes 394-99 and accompanying text.
If the court's decision is limited by its facts, its ruling that no showing of an adverse effect
on competition is required in an antitrust/competition case is dictum. In any event, the
decision has long since been displaced by subsequent judicial developments.
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Application of Section 75-1.1 as a "Low-Test" AntitrustStatute

The plaintiffs in several cases having antitrust "character" have
urged that full-fledged antitrust standards, whether federal or state,
are inapplicable because section 75-1.1 reaches conduct not reached
by antitrust law. Several courts have agreed with this claim. For
example, the plaintiff in Telephone Services, Inc. v. General Telephone
Co.275 claimed that section 75-1.1 "has been read broadly to prohibit
unfair trade practices, including anticompetitive practices, not
prohibited by Federal Law."276 Although it accepted the plaintiff's
interpretation of the North Carolina statute, the court nevertheless
held that refusing to employ a competitor was not an unfair trade
practice. 277
Similarly, in L.C. Williams Oil, Inc. v. Exxon Corp.,78 the
plaintiff argued that the defendant's conduct "violate[d] the North
Carolina statute even if the standards for violations of the federal
antitrust laws are not met."27 9 Although it granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment, the court did so stating "that no
commercial unfairness or deception exists in this case to warrant
expansion of [section] 75-1.1 beyond what is contained in the Clayton
and Sherman Acts." 0 The negative implication is that another case
might warrant such "expansion."
The court also considered, although it did not rule on the issue,
whether with section 75-1.1 the North Carolina General Assembly
had in mind filling the antitrust "gap" that was noted in Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp."' That "gap" arises from the fact
that, as a matter of federal antitrust law, a single firm with substantial
market power can achieve an adverse effect on market price and
output that would be illegal if accomplished by two or more firms by
combination. But, because it is a single firm, its conduct is not illegal
unless the requirements for monopolization or attempt to monopolize
are satisfied.'
In short, the court, in L.C. Williams Oil Co.,
demonstrated sympathy for the possible "stretching" of section 75-1.1

275. 92 N.C. App. 90,373 S.E.2d 440 (1988).
276. Id. at 94,373 S.E.2d at 442.
277. Id. at 94,373 S.E.2d at 442-43.
278. 625 F. Supp. 477 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
279. Id. at 482.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 488 n.10 (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S.
752 (1984) as producing the "gap" problem).
282. For the components of these offenses, see supra note 106.
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to cover conduct not reached by federal or state antitrust laws,
although it did not itself engage in such stretching.
In Murrow Furniture Galleries, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture
Industries, Inc. , 3 "[t]he Discounters argue[d] that they have a
stronger likelihood of success under their state law claim because
[section] 75-1.1 prohibits unfair trade practices outside the orbit of
The plaintiffs, discount furniture retailers,
the Sherman Act."'
sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendant, a furniture
manufacturer, from implementing a policy that prevented the
plaintiffs from selling furniture at discount prices out of state using
the telephone or the mail. The federal antitrust claim was rejected
for failure to prove a relevant market and an adverse effect on
competition in that marketZ 6 For their section 75-1.1 claim, however,
the plaintiffs argued that the defendant engaged in unfairness and
While this claim was also
deception by changing its policies.'
rejected,18 the case demonstrates a challenge facing the courts in
applying section 75-1.1, namely, how to apply the full statute fairly
and responsibly while recognizing that advocates will seek creatively
to utilize the unfair/deceptive prong in order to seek treble damages
for conduct that does not violate the antitrust laws.
While the plaintiff in McDaniel v. Greensboro News Co. 9 did
not urge the broader sweep of section 75-1.1 relative to federal and
state antitrust law, the court's methodology demonstrated the
potential benefit of such claims. Dealing with the resale price
maintenance claims, the court simultaneously denied defendant's
summary judgment motion based on the Sherman Act section 1 claim
and the section 75-1 and 75-2 claims.290 It then dealt separately with
the section 75-1.1 claim, recited the definitions of unfair and
deceptive practices and denied the motion. 9 ' While the outcome in
McDaniel was proper, the court's method of analysis creates the
opportunity in an unmistakable antitrust context for a court to find no
mainline antitrust violation but, by application of the unfair/deceptive
prong of section 75-1.1, to allow the plaintiff access to treble damages

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

889 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 529.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 526-27.
Id. at 529.
Id.
1984-1 Trade Cases (CCH) T 65,792 (M.D.N.C. 1983).
Id. at 67,277.
Id. at 67,279.
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and attorney fees through application of a "low test" antitrust
standard.2 92
These cases demonstrate that there is a substantial potential for
section 75-1.1 to be used as a "low test" antitrust statute. This could
happen either by way of application of the unfair methods prong that
fails to incorporate antitrust standards, even "stretched" antitrust
standards as applied by the FTC in section 5 cases, or by cases having
predominantly antitrust characteristics treated nonrigorously under
A generalized
the unfair/deceptive prong of section 75-1.1.
acceptance by practitioners and courts of the position that conduct
not banned by antitrust standards "can still be reached as an unfair
trade practice" can easily lead to either outcome, or both.
Indeed, in at least three cases such outcomes have occurred
although two of them involved judicial recognition of an applicable
business tort. In Southern Pines Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler
Corp.,293 the plaintiff auto dealer won a jury verdict complaining that
Chrysler forced it not just to purchase the "full line" of cars required
by its contract but also less desirable models as a condition of
obtaining more desirable ones.2 94 The Fourth Circuit reversed the
antitrust verdict because the plaintiff failed to show separate "tying"
and "tied" products as required by antitrust cases, 295 but remanded
the section 75-1.1 unfairness claim to enable the district court to
clarify whether it found unfairness as a matter of law.296
In two recent decisions, the plaintiffs lost their antitrust claims at
the summary judgment stage, but preserved their section 75-1.1
claims. The plaintiff and defendant in Edmondson v. American
Motorcycle Ass'n 2 competed in staging motorcycle races. 2 98 For
292. Id.
293. 826 F.2d 1360 (4th Cir. 1987).
294. Id. at 1361-62.
295. Id. at 1363. As noted earlier, supra note 99, the antitrust tying offense involves a
seller requirement that the buyer purchase a "fled" product in order to obtain a separate
"tying" product. The court in Southern Pines Chrysler-Plymouth quoted the U.S.
Supreme Court in Jefferson Parish Hospital DistrictNo. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21 (1984),
for the proposition: "[A] tying arrangement cannot exist unless two separate product
markets have been linked." S. Pines,826 F.2d at 1363.
296. Id. at 1364-65. The court also noted that the "forcing by a manufacturer of a
single type of product in excess of the agreed amount ... is punishable under more
common state remedies, including contract and tort remedies, and does not require the
powerful prohibition of the antitrust laws." Id. at 1363. In the first instance, such
"common state remedies" would not present the same concern for a successful antitrust
defendant since, unlike section 75-1.1, they would not involve automatic treble damages.
Of course, some such cases could afford the possibility of punitive damages.
297. 243 F.3d 537, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1506 (4th Cir. Feb. 2, 2001) (unpublished
table decision).
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several years they participated in a joint venture to organize such
races. 99 Defendant offered to purchase plaintiff's interest in the joint
venture but then decided it could take over his interest without
paying.3 Although it rejected the antitrust claims, the court found
that the defendant's misrepresentations regarding its interest in
purchasing the plaintiff's share, while simultaneously laying plans to
take over his interest without paying, was an "unfair and deceptive
practice,"301 as well as "an unfair trade practice or method of
competition.""3 2 It held that the defendant's promotion of races in
1995 and later, as though they were those of the joint venture, was "a
form of passing off" and therefore an unfair method of competition. 0 3
And it found that defendant's interference with certain of plaintiff's
contractual interests, found otherwise
to be tortious interference, was
"unfair competitive practice. ' '3 4
The plaintiff in Bepco, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc.30 5 competed with
the defendant in the aftermarket sale of remanufactured compressors
and valves for truck airbrake systems.306 Allied-Signal had a strong
position in the original equipment markets for systems, compressors,
and valves, but the aftermarkets were less concentrated. 30 7 The court
granted summary judgment for Allied-Signal on the plaintiff's
exclusive dealing claim based on section 1 of the Sherman Act and
section 3 of the Clayton Act,308 and on the plaintiffs section 2
Sherman monopolization and attempted monopolization claims. 309 It
found that Allied-Signal's exclusive dealing arrangements with
distributors reached only small percentages of the outlets, that they
were of short duration, that other distribution outlets were available,
and that the markets were vigorously competitive.3 10 The section 2
claims failed both because the court believed Allied-Signal's market
shares were insufficient to demonstrate monopoly power, for the
monopolization claim, or dangerous probability of success, for the
298. Id. at *4.
299. Id.
300. Id. at *9.
301. Id. at *39.
302. Id. at *40.
303. Id. at *41.
304. Id.
305. 106 F. Supp. 2d 814 (M.D.N.C. 2000).
306. Id. at 816.
307. Id. at 817. The court used market shares for Allied-Signal of 43% and 37% for
the compressor and valve aftermarkets, respectively. Id. at 818.
308. Id. at 826-29.
309. Id. at 830-33.
310. Id. at 827-29.
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attempt claim, and because its conduct was not predatory.31 ' The
court, nevertheless, denied the summary judgment motion on the
unfair trade practices claims under section 75-1.1, stating that it
"appear[ed] to encompass more than the federal antitrust claims
which the court has rejected, and include[s] product disparagement
and defamation. 3 12 The court emphasized, however, that the section
was "not
75-1.1 claim was allowed to remain only to the extent that it
3 13
claims.
antitrust
federal
rejected
[plaintiffs]
dependent on
B.

Suggestionsfor Dealing with the Problem of Section 75-1.1 as a
"Low Test" Antitrust Statute

The three cases reported above are good examples of the "low
test" problem since they show that an antitrust victor may
nevertheless be penalized by section 75-1.1 treble damages. Although
Southern Pines Chrysler-Plymouth lost its antitrust "tying" case, it
was given the chance on remand to show that Chrysler's demands
were "unfair" and should be subjected to treble damages. 14
Similarly, Edmondson lost his antitrust claims on summary judgment
but was given several opportunities to show a section 75-1.1 violation
by proving tortious conduct. And, while the traditional antitrust
claims of exclusive dealing in Bepco v. Allied-Signal did not survive
summary judgment, the plaintiff retained the hope that under section
75-1.1 it could prove product disparagement or defamation. Even
though both the section 75-1.1 and antitrust claims lost, Murrow
Furniture also illustrates the potential problem. The defendant
furniture manufacturer argued that its requirement of point-of-sale
services promoted interbrand competition, while the telephone/mail
discounters argued that their forced abandonment of these methods
was unfair.315
1 6 provide another good
The facts of In re General Foods Corp."
example of the problem.. In General Foods, the FTC held that
predatory pricing activity did not violate section 2 of the Sherman Act
because there was no "dangerous probability" that a monopoly would
be achieved. It then rejected the argument of its own complaint
See supra note 106 for monopolization and attempted
311. Id. at 830-33.
monopolization components.
312. Bepco, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 834.
313. Id.
314. S. Pines Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 826 F.2d 1360, 1363-65 (4th
Cir. 1987).
315. Murrow Furniture Galleries, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture Indus., Inc., 889 F.2d
524, 529 (4th Cir. 1989).
316. 103 F.T.C. 204 (1984).
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counsel that the conduct should be held, nevertheless, to be an unfair
method of competition under section 5 of the FTC Act.317 Similar
facts in a North Carolina case could result in a firm arguing that its
competitor's low prices were "unfair" even though they were not
3 18
predatory by antitrust standards.
Consumer interests may have been well served by the antitrust
outcomes in these cases. Interbrand competition and, therefore,
consumers may have benefited from Chrysler's demands that its
dealers stock all of its cars. Such a requirement may enable the
manufacturer to achieve manufacturing efficiencies and economies of
scale or scope in distribution. The requirement may increase output
and the range of consumer choice, although dealers may object to
carrying the full line.319 Exclusive dealing arrangements of the sort
involved in Bepco can also be procompetitive. Such agreements can
encourage both suppliers and customers to make commitments to
production and sales plans and facilities by reducing supplier
uncertainty about sales volume and dealer uncertainty about sources
of supply. Such risk reduction serves to increase output, which
benefits consumers.2 °
While the case against the discounters in Murrow Furniture is
more complicated since their activities undoubtedly benefited some
consumers in the short run, a furniture manufacturer-and
consumers, in the long run-need a distribution network, which might
not survive for long against free-riding discounters. A furniture
manufacturer must either open its own retail outlets or arrange for
retail distribution with dealers willing to handle substantial
inventories, display the furniture attractively, and deal with customer
inquiries and complaints. Such dealers could not bear the cost of such
services if they had to compete against other dealers enjoying lower
costs by offering only a telephone number and/or a post office box

317. Id. at 364-66.
318. Predatory pricing as an antitrust matter is "pricing below an appropriate measure
of cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in the short run and reducing
competition in the long run." Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117
(1986). The most frequently-referenced "measure of cost" below which prices must lie in
order to be considered predatory is average variable cost. Predatory pricing may be
challenged as satisfying the predation component of the monopolization offense or as
primary line price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act. See ANTITRUST L.
DEV., supra note 44, at 256-69,474-77.
319. HOVENKAMP, supranote 64, at 427.
320. Id. at 433-35.
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address.321 If they were forced to close, furniture distribution along
with manufacturer and consumer welfare would be threatened.
Finally, as suggested by General Foods, for a firm to win a
section 75-1.1 unfairness claim against the vigorous, but not
antitrust/predatory, pricing of a competitor would be an obvious loss
for consumers. A firm's price does not become predatory or illegal
for antitrust purposes unless it falls "below an appropriate measure of
its rival's costs. ' '32 Giving legal recognition to the complaint of an
inefficient firm that a competitor's low but nonpredatory price is an
"unfair act" or "practice" would "permit less efficient firms to stay in
the market. '' 431 Such an outcome would be harmful to the interests of
32
consumers.
The problem raised by these cases is that conduct deemed not in
violation of the antitrust laws and, therefore, not anticompetitiveperhaps, even, efficient, procompetitive and proconsumer-runs the
risk of incurring treble damages under section 75-1.1. It has been
noted above (1) that section 5 of the FTC Act "was conceived as a
vehicle for evolving new administrative prohibitions of conduct not
previously thought unlawful, which is presumably the reason that
most of its sanctions are prospective only and invoked only by public
officials," 321 (2) but that section 75-1.1 is a verbatim reproduction of
FTC Act section 5, (3) that, unlike FTC Act section 5 which provides
no private right of action, section 75-1.1 affords the successful plaintiff
treble damages automatically with the possibility of attorney fees as
well, and (4) that section 75-1.1 not only has its own uncertain
coverage of conduct deemed "unfair" or "deceptive" but that it
incorporates, for the most part, the bulk of North Carolina business
tort law. The "teeth" of section 75-1.1, as opposed to FTC Act
section 5, combined with the uncertainty associated with its coverage
creates substantial concern about its potential to penalize
procompetitive conduct that has cleared antitrust review.
321. See, e.g., Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977); HOVENKAMP,
supra note 64, at 450-51.
322. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222
(1993). "Competition drives prices to marginal costs." HOVENKAMP, supra note 64, at
337. Subjects well beyond the scope of this article include the debate about the proper
cost standard for antitrust predatory pricing cases and whether there may be some cases
where above-cost prices are predatory. See id. at 337-44.
323. HOVENKAMP, supra note 64, at 336.

324. "[A] legal precedent or rule of law that prevents a firm from unilaterally cutting
its prices risks interference with one of the Sherman Act's most basic objectives: the low
price levels that one would find in well-functioning competitive markets." Barry Wright
Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227,231 (1st Cir. 1983).
325. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 122, at 349.
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Against these concerns there are some contrary and promising
developments. For one, there are some cases in which the section 751.1 claim was dealt with on the same terms as the antitrust claim. In
Hester v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc.,326 the plaintiff attorney
complained of a conspiracy involving Martindale-Hubbell, the
American Bar Association, and the North Carolina State Bar that
precluded him because of his rating from publishing his "professional
card" in the "biographical section" of the Martindale directory. 327
The court granted summary judgment on the section 1 Sherman Act
claim and the section 75-1 claim for failure to show adequate
evidence of a conspiracy and on the section 2 Sherman Act claim for
failure to show willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly
power. 328 It dismissed the section 75-1.1 claim for the same reasons
and because Martindale "acted within its unilateral right to establish
uniform publication policies." 329

Another promising factor is judicial concern about the
availability of section 75-1.1 treble damages where antitrust liability is
not found. For example, in General United Co. v. American Honda
Motor Co.,330 although the antitrust claim was without merit, the court
applied a very helpful methodology in disposing of the section 75-1.1
claims. Sales to the plaintiff, a Honda motorcycle dealer in Gastonia,
were terminated by the defendant when the plaintiff became
delinquent in its payments.331 However, defendant continued to sell
on a cash basis to at least one other dealer that was also delinquent in
its payments, although less so than the plaintiff.332 The plaintiff
"made a vague claim for some unspecified federal antitrust violation"
and for violation of section 75-1.1. On summary judgment, the court
carefully assessed and rejected all potential antitrust claims.33 In
rejecting the section 75-1.1 unfair practice claim, the court identified
three factors supporting its decision. First, it noted that since the
conduct did not violate the antitrust laws, it did not "offend any
established public policy. ''3 4 Second, it observed that the defendant's
conduct was not "substantially injurious to consumers. '335 Finally, it
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

493 F. Supp. 335 (E.D.N.C. 1980), affd, 659 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 337.
Id. at 338-39.
Id. at 341.
618 F. Supp. 1452 (W.D.N.C. 1985).
Id. at 1453.
Id. at 1454.
Id.
Id. at 1455.
Id.
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found no "'substantial aggravating circumstances' ... that would
'
justify the punishment of treble damages."336
Reflecting a similar approach, the court in Bepco, although
allowing the section 75-1.1 claim to survive summary judgment,
emphasized that the claim could not be based on any conduct cleared
of antitrust concerns.33 7 The question is whether the Bepco rule can
be applied universally, that is, whether conduct that has "antitrust
character" or that involves "anticompetitive practices," as opposed to
unfair or deceptive practices, and that is found not to trigger either
federal or state antitrust standards should, as a result, acquire
immunity from being found unfair or deceptive.
The question, in turn, may be whether the case involves facts
having "pure" antitrust character or whether it involves both antitrust
facts and ancillary practices challengeable as product disparagement,
338
passing off, tortious interference, or some other business tort.
Cases in the first category, where no antitrust violation is found,
should not be revisited by use of the unfair/deceptive prong of section
340 Southern
75-1.1. 3 1 This suggestion applies to cases like McDaniel,
341
3
4
2
Pines Chrysler-Plymouth, Murrow Furniture, and Hester4 3 and to
44
the hypothetical facts based on General Foods.3
Those cases
involved facts having antitrust character with no ancillary practices
otherwise challengeable. Although the court in Southern Pines
remanded the section 75-1.1 unfairness claim, the antitrust rulings

governed the outcomes in McDaniel and Hester. As for the General
Foods situation and similar cases, the plaintiff who fails to prove its
336. Id. at 1455-56. For this factor, the court cited United Roasters, Inc. v. ColgatePalmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985, 992 (4th Cir. 1989), which used the proposition for the
purpose of avoiding treble damages for a simple breach of contract. Gen. United, 618 F.
Supp. at 1455. Applying a concept that has been widely used since, the court said that if a
breach of contract award is to be trebled, "the North Carolina legislature must have
intended that substantial aggravating circumstances be present." Id.
337. Bepco, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 814,834 (M.D.N.C. 2000).
338. The national survey reported in Saferstein found that "some form of claim
labelled [sic] 'tortious interference' [was] filed along with antitrust claims twice as
frequently as the next most frequent [tort] claims." Saferstein, supranote 151, at 385.
339. This is true whether the case is assessed under federal or state antitrust law or by
using antitrust analysis under the unfair methods prong of section 75-1.1.
340. McDaniel v. Greensboro News Co., 1984-1 Trade Cases (CCH)
65,792
(M.D.N.C. 1983).
341. S. Pines Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 826 F.2d 1360 (4th Cir. 1987).
342. Murrow Furniture Galleries, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture Indus., Inc., 889 F.2d
524 (4th Cir. 1989).
343. Hester v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 335 (E.D.N.C. 1980), affd, 659
F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1981).
344. In re Gen. Foods Corp., 103 F.T.C. 204 (1984).
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competitor's prices are sufficiently low to satisfy the monopolization
standard of predatory prices should not be allowed to argue,
alternatively, that they are low enough to be an "unfair practice"
under section 75-1.1.
Cases in the second category, however, may not lend themselves
to the same treatment. Where there are both antitrust facts and
ancillary unfairness or "tort" facts, rejection of the antitrust claim
may necessarily leave the ancillary facts for separate treatment. This
was the Bepco case itself, where the plaintiff had both exclusionary
dealing antitrust claims but also claims of product disparagement and
defamation 45 Although the defendant obtained summary judgment
on the antitrust claims, the court remanded the ancillary claims but
cautioned that the antitrust claims were not to be retried pursuant to
a lower section 75-1.1 unfairness standard. 46
Whether ancillary facts genuinely exist may itself be an issue.
Murrow Furniture47 illustrates this problem. The plaintiffs, discount
furniture dealers, lost their antitrust claims but creatively argued that
the defendant's change in its policies gave the basis for an
unfair/deceptive section 75-1.1 claim. 34s The policy change, however,
did not present real ancillary facts.
In short, the factors and analysis used by the Bepco and General
United courts deserve attention in dealing with section 75-1.1 cases
having antitrust character or involving anticompetitive practices.
Bepco would not allow the antitrust conduct found not to violate
antitrust standards to suffer a second look under section 75-1.1.
General United would take into account whether the conduct
involved "aggravating factors," whether it violated the antitrust law,
and whether it was injurious to consumers.9
The latter factor also finds support in the recent Fourth Circuit
decision in Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 350 In a nonantitrust context, the court reversed Food Lion's favorable verdict on
its claim that an ABC employee engaged in deceptive activity in
violation of section 75-1.1.
The alleged violation involved
misrepresentations made when the ABC employee applied for a job
at Food Lion for the purpose of exposing the improper handling of

345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

Bepco, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 814 (M.D.N.C. 2000).
See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
889 F.2d 524,529 (4th Cir. 1989).
See supra notes 283-88 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 334-36 and accompanying text.
194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
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meat by Food Lion employees.351 The court held that in the past
"businesses" have been allowed to press unfair/deceptive claims
"against another business only when the businesses are competitors
(or potential competitors) or are engaged in commercial dealings with
each other. '352 Believing that condition unsatisfied here, the court
said that in such situations such claims will be allowed only when a
victory for the plaintiff would be for the benefit of the consuming
353
public.
An expansion of the Food Lion principle would suggest that, in
cases where the defendant is accused of engaging in unfair or
deceptive acts or practices, plaintiffs, whether competitors "engaged
in commercial dealings with each other" or not, should not be allowed
section 75-1.1 victories if the defendant can show that its conduct
promoted the best interests of consumers.
The problem with a generalized application of that principle is
that there may be cases where the defendant in a business tort case,
treated either as an independent tort or as a section 75-1.1 unfairness
claim, could plausibly argue that its conduct was procompetitive. In
such a case, allowing a "competition defense" would create a collision
with established business tort law. One could imagine, for example, a
small competitor, say Bepco, "tortiously interfering" with the supply
contracts or distributor arrangements of a larger competitor, say
Allied-Signal, that would have the effect of reducing the market share
and market power of the larger competitor and, as a result, produce a
procompetitive, proconsumer result. The larger competitor in this
scenario would lose at least some of its ability to impose adverse price
and output effects on consumers. The problem is that the tortious
interference claim against the smaller competitor-defendant may be
quite solid on the basis of existing law.
Three observations afford some comfort. First, such cases are
likely to be rare. The more typical business tort case, or section 751.1 case rooted in a business tort, undoubtedly has the larger
competitor as the defendant. That defendant will probably not have a
defense that its conduct benefited competition and consumers.
Second, "[b]usiness tort doctrine long has recognized a privilege for
conduct that is legitimately competitive."3 4 Citing the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and other authorities, Hobbs notes that "courts

351.
352.
353.
354.

Id. at 510.
Id. at 520.
Id.
Hobbs, supra note 270, at 16.
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generally have held that, while competition is not a defense to a claim
of interference with an existing contract not terminable at will, it is a
valid defense to a claim of interference with a contract that is
terminable at will, or to a claim of interference with prospective
advantage."355 To the extent that defendants in business tort cases
can present "competition" defenses, plaintiffs' claims may not be
totally solid after all. 356
Third, while a combination of the first two factors provides
comfort-suggesting that only rarely will a defendant whose conduct
benefited consumers be properly found liable in a business tort caseit would also seem (1) that where the defendant has a viable
"competition defense," the plaintiffs case should be held to a very

high standard and (2) that, in particular, the presumption should run
in the defendant's favor where its competition case is strong and the
plaintiff relies not on a previously well-etched business tort claim but
on an undifferentiated claim of "unfairness" or "deception" under
section 75-1.1. In short, while the danger that an unsuccessful
355. Id. at 17.
356. Such competition defenses have received generous treatment in North Carolina
courts. Tortious interference with contract in North Carolina requires that the defendant
"without justification" intentionally induce the nonperformance of a known, valid
contract. United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 661, 370 S.E.2d 375, 387 (1988);
Sea-Roy Corp. v. Parts R Parts, Inc., 1998-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 72,155, at 81,995
(M.D.N.C. 1997), aff'd per curiam, No. 98-1028, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3383 (4th Cir.
Mar. 4, 1999). Whether the conduct is "without justification" depends upon "the
circumstances surrounding the interference, the actor's motive or conduct, the interests
sought to be advanced [and] the social interest in protecting the freedom of action of the
actor." Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Hooks, 322 N.C. 216, 221,367 S.E.2d 647, 650 (1988).
Accepting a justification argument characterized as a "competition privilege," the court in
Sea-Roy rejected plaintiff's tortious interference claim, holding that the defendant's
conduct in displacing Sea-Roy as a distributor was the kind of conduct "expected in a
hearty competitive environment" and that its actions were "geared toward lawful
competition." Sea-Roy, 1998-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 72,155, at 81,995-96. Similarly, in
Hooks, the court rejected a tortious interference claim where the defendant offered jobs
to employees of its competitor who had terminable at will contracts, hired them, and, by
locating them in their original sales territories, "induced them to breach the
noncompetition clauses contained in their contracts with the plaintiff." Hooks, 322 N.C. at
221, 367 S.E.2d at 650. The court spoke broadly of a competition privilege, noting that
"[c]ompetition is the life of trade," Id. at 223, 367 S.E.2d at 651, and stating that "we
recognize and apply the general principle that interference may be justified when the
plaintiff and the defendant are competitors." Id. at 222, 367 S.E.2d at 650. Indeed, it
appears that "[w]here the circumstances surrounding a tortious interference claim involve
a business competitor, the party asserting the claim must show that the competitor acted
with malice or a bad motive." Combs & Assocs., Inc. v. Kennedy, 147 N.C. App. 362,372,
555 S.E.2d 634, 641 (2001). On facts similar to those in Hooks, however, the court in
Kuykendall remanded the case apparently believing that the jury might find evidence of
malicious intent on the part of the defendant in hiring an employee of its competitor.
Kuykendall, 322 N.C. at 660-64,370 S.E.2d at 386-88.
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antitrust plaintiff may nevertheless prevail on a section 75-1.1 claim
clearly exists, there are ways to deal with the problem.
It would seem first that when the plaintiff loses a nontrivial
antitrust claim but also has a section 75-1.1 unfair/deceptive claim, the
court's attention should ratchet up substantially to guard against a
section 75-1.1 outcome that might be contrary to consumer interests.
Second, where the conduct at issue clearly has antitrust character
and where there are no significant ancillary facts supporting an
unfairness, deception, or a business tort claim, the court should
seriously consider applying the Bepco methodology and decline to
give the conduct separate or different treatment in the application of
section 75-1.1. In other words, in such cases the antitrust analysis and
the section 75-1.1 analysis should be identical.
Third, even where ancillary facts or circumstances exist, the court
should find a section 75-1.1 violation only (a) after careful analysis,
(b) reliance on clearly applicable unfairness, deception or commercial
tort precedent, (c) clear and specific assignment of the case to the
proper section 75-1.1 prong and unfairness or deception subprong or
to a specific tort, and (d) careful consideration of any meritorious
"competition defense" presented by the defendant with a
presumption that such a defense prevails over an undifferentiated
unfairness claim, as opposed to a claim based on a previously welldefined business tort or unfairness standard.
VII. FEDERAL PRECEDENT AND CONSUMER STANDING TO ASSERT
UNFAIR METHODS CLAIMS

Part A of this section shows that the weight of section 75-1.1
authority agrees with federal precedent that the plaintiff pursuing a
section 75-1.1 antitrust case must show that the defendant's conduct
had, or threatened, an adverse effect on market competition. In a
case subject to the per se rule, the plaintiff can rely upon the
operation of the rule and need not prove an adverse effect. The cases
discussed here show support for the importance of consumer welfare
in antitrust cases decided under section 75-1.1. Part B discusses Van
Dorn Retail Management, Inc. v. Klaussner Furniture Industries,
Inc.,35 in which the court inadequately analyzed the question whether
secondary line price discrimination should be held to violate section
75-1.1. Finally, Part C discusses whether consumers can assert
methods of competition claims under section 75-1.1, an issue that
357. 132 N.C. App. 531,512 S.E.2d 456 (1999).
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arises only because some decisions suggest they cannot. It is urged
here that the weight of the authority supports the view that
consumers may assert such claims.
A.

Whether in a Non-PerSe Antitrust Case under Section 75-1.1 the
PlaintiffMust Show an Adverse Effect on Competitionin a
Relevant Market

Unfortunately, the North Carolina Supreme Court has not had
occasion to deal with the question whether, in order to prevail in a
non-per se, rule of reason antitrust case presented under the unfair
methods prong of section 75-1.1, the plaintiff would be required to
show a net adverse effect on market competition. It has ruled,
however, in a section 75-1 context, that an adverse effect on
competition must be shown.35 8 Such a showing, as noted above, is
clearly required in federal antitrust cases applying the rule of
reason. 359 Several federal court decisions have held, and/or strongly
indicated that, in such a case arising under section 75-1.1, a showing
of an adverse effect on market competition is required. It may be
presumed that, consistent with their longstanding policy of finding
federal antitrust authorities "instructive" although not binding, the
North Carolina appellate courts will follow such holdings.
The principal state court opinion that applies the rule of reason
in a manner relevant to this issue is the 1973 Rose v. Vulcan Materials
Co.360 decision. In that case, the supreme court rejected the claim that
a contract providing for a discriminatorily low price violated section
75-1.361 The court found no section I Sherman Act cases finding such
a violation.3 62 Therefore, it held that the contract was not a per se
violation of section 75-1 and that it was not "unreasonablyin restraint
of trade" because there was no showing regarding "the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. '363 That the court was
inquiring about anticompetitive effect is evident from its earlier
statements that "the term 'restraint of trade' evolved in England to
include unreasonable restrictions on competition" and that under the
rule of reason only "combinations ... which operate to the prejudice
358. Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643, 194 S.E.2d 521 (1973).
359. See supra Part III(B).
360. 282 N.C. 643, 194 S.E.2d 521 (1973).
361. Id. at 651-52,194 S.E.2d at 527.
362. Id. at 655,194 S.E.2d at 530.
363. Id. at 657, 194 S.E.2d at 531. The formula invoked by the court is a quote from
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), the federal antitrust
case considered to have been one of the earliest applications of the rule of reason and
setting out the analytical formula quoted ever after for applying the rule. Id.
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of the public by unduly or unreasonably restricting competition or
restraining trade are illegal. ' 364 Although Rose involved section 75-1,
not 75-1.1, it appears that when the North Carolina appellate courts
identify a section 75-1.1 antitrust claim that must be treated under the
rule of reason, they will find compelling the Rose precedent of
inquiring about the effect on market competition.
Two other state court decisions are relevant to this issue. In its
1987 decision in Dull v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.,365 the court
of appeals passed up a good opportunity to require plaintiffs in
section 75-1.1 antitrust cases to demonstrate an adverse effect on
competition. As noted above, the court was pressed into antitrust
analysis by the plaintiffs' reliance on the United States Supreme
Court decision in FTC v. Brown Shoe Co.,366 in which the Court
upheld the FTC's finding of a violation involving an exclusive dealing
arrangement. 36 7
In Brown Shoe, the Court noted that the
arrangements prevented Brown's customers from buying shoes from
its competitors and "foreclosed Brown's competitors from selling to a
'
substantial number of retail shoe dealers."368
The Court, however,
rejected respondent's argument that the FTC was required to show an
adverse effect on competition, stating that under section 5 the FTC
was authorized to "arrest trade restraints in their incipiency."3 69
Seeking to distinguish Brown Shoe, the court in Dull noted several
factors, including that the plaintiffs had not shown "that defendants'
competitors were in any way foreclosed from marketing insurance
products to the public.""37 The court might have distinguished Brown
Shoe directly regarding anticompetitive effect by stating that unlike
FTC Act section 5, as interpreted in Brown Shoe, plaintiffs in section
75-1.1 cases must show an adverse effect on competition. Instead, by
simply reciting, although in broadened form, a factor (the preclusion
of outlets to competitors of the supplier) the Brown Shoe Court
found insufficient alone to demonstrate an adverse effect on
competition, it cannot be read to have articulated an adverse effect
requirement for section 75-1.1.

364. Id. at 656, 194 S.E.2d at 530. Moreover, it appears in context that the court's
reference to "restricting competition" was, indeed, a reference to market competition, not
simply harm to particular competitors.
365. 85 N.C. App. 310, 354 S.E.2d 752 (1987).
366. 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
367. Dull,85 N.C. App. at 316, 354 S.E.2d at 755.
368. Brown Shoe, 384 U.S. at 318-19.
369. Id. at 322.
370. Dull, 85 N.C. App. at 316-17,354 S.E.2d at 756.
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In the other relevant state court decision, the North Carolina
Supreme Court, in Owens v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.,371 rejected the
defendant's argument that "plaintiffs claim makes no economic
sense." 372 This rejection should not be read as an announcement by
the court that in a non-per se antitrust case a showing of an adverse
effect on competition will not be required. The argument was
rejected in Owens because it was not supported by the facts, not
because of its theoretical invalidity.373 More importantly, the
argument arose in the context of a minimum resale price maintenance
claim, for proof of which an antitrust plaintiff may rely upon the per
se rule rather than demonstrating an adverse effect on competition
under the rule of reason.
As for the federal cases, Sea-Roy Corp. v. PartsR Parts, Inc. 374 is
the most recent one. While the court's treatment of the section 75-1.1
issues is unsatisfactory because of its failure to clearly specify the
prong involved, the decision can be read to grant summary judgment
on the unfair methods claim because of the plaintiff's failure "to
establish... an adverse effect on competition. '37 5 The clarity of this
ruling is enhanced by the fact that the court disposed of the Sherman
Act section I claim for failure of the plaintiff to show anticompetitive
effects;376 377it also dismissed the section 75-1 claim "for the same
reasons."

Several other federal decisions came down in the 1983-89
timeframe, the earliest being Stearns v. Genrad, Inc., where the
court applied the rule of reason to dispose of Sherman and Clayton
Act claims for the plaintiffs' failure to show an adverse effect on
competition. The court dismissed North Carolina Chapter 75 claims
for the same reason, but as to the section 75-1.1 claim specifically, the
court noted that the plaintiff "has made absolutely no effort to
371. 330 N.C. 666, 412 S.E.2d 636 (1992). Owens is discussed supra at notes 205-07 and
accompanying text.
372. Id. at 677,412 S.E.2d at 642.
373. Id.
374. 1998-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 72,155, at 81,990-91 (M.D.N.C. 1997), affd, 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 3383 (4th Cir. Mar. 4, 1999).
375. Id. at 81,994 n.25.
376. The heading of this section of the opinion was "anticompetitive effects". Id. at
81,993.
377. Id. at 81,993-94 & n.25.
378. 564 F. Supp. 1309 (M.D.N.C. 1983), affjd on other grounds, 752 F.2d 942 (4th Cir.
1984). CF Industries, Inc. v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 448 F. Supp. 475
(W.D.N.C. 1978), was decided five years before Stearns. Although it was not an antitrust
case, the court in dismissing the claim said that there was "no allegation of any anticompetitive effect" and no "claim of injury to competition." Id. at 485.
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demonstrate any effect upon overall competition in any relevant
'
Next was L. C. Williams Oil,3 0 another terminated dealer
market."379
case. The plaintiff "misbranded" gasoline purchased elsewhere as
Exxon gasoline.3 81 The court granted Exxon's motion for summary
judgment, rejecting the plaintiff's arguments that Exxon imposed
upon it a "no growth" policy and price discriminated against it."
Viewing section 75-1.1 as "a comprehensive law designed to include
within its reach the federal antitrust laws, ' '3n the court granted the
motion noting that plaintiff had not sustained its burden "of showing
an ability to prove at trial the 'substantial' effect on the market
incorporated into North
necessary for a violation of the antitrust' 3 laws
4
Carolina's Unfair Trade Practices Act. 8
Yet another terminated dealer case is pertinent because, even
though it involved the South Carolina equivalent of section 75-1.1, it
is subsequently cited by courts applying section 75-1.1. The plaintiff
in Chuck's Feed & Seed Co. v. Ralston Purina Co. 31 had been for
many years a Ralston Purina dealer exclusively, but it was terminated
by the defendant in 1982, one year after it took on the ConAgra
line. 6 The termination was for its "failure to obtain market
penetration. ' '3 7 The court, reversing a jury verdict for Chuck's Feed,
looked to federal exclusive dealing cases and concluded that the
plaintiff failed "to show a negative impact on competition in the
market as a whole. ' '31 Articulating a simple concept that would have
been extremely helpful long ago to courts deciding cases under
section 75-1.1, the court said: "Like the Federal Trade Commission
Act, the South Carolina statute is aimed at two distinct kinds of

379. Stearns, 564 F. Supp. at 1318. The court in American Rockwool, Inc. v. OwensCorning FiberglasCorp., 640 F. Supp. 1411 (E.D.N.C. 1986), stated that this language was
"clearly dicta and not the predicate for the court's decision." Id. at 1434.
380. 625 F. Supp. 477 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
381. See id. at 480.
382. Id. at 482-86.
383. Id. at 481.
384. Id. at 484.
385. 810 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir. 1987).
386. Id. at 1291.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 1295. The court emphasized the broad scope of the competitive inquiry,
stating that it must occur in the context of a relevant product and geographic market, it
"must determine how much of that market has been closed off to the products of
competing manufacturers," the court must ask "whether or not competitors have found or
are likely to find it difficult to enter or remain in the market," and, finally, it should
"consider any procompetitive effects of the exclusive dealing arrangements that would
justify their use." Id.
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conduct: unfair or deceptive practices and anticompetitive
practices.
38 9
here.
issue
at
are
practices
Only anticompetitive
Relying on Chuck's Feed & Seed, the court in Sewell Plastics,
Inc., v. Coca-Cola Co.3 9° disposed of federal antitrust claims on
summary judgment for the plaintiff's failure to show an adverse effect
on competition, and, with a few more words, disposed of the section
75-1.1 claim for the same reason.391 The court noted that the Fourth
Circuit in Chuck's Feed & Seed had interpreted the similar South
Carolina statute "to require a showing of an adverse effect on
competition when the claim is directed at anticompetitive (rather than
unfair or deceptive) practices"'3 2 and that the Fourth Circuit had cited
Stearns v. Genrad "with approval," which granted summary judgment
"because plaintiff made no showing of an adverse effect on
393
competition.
The only authority to the contrary appears to be American
Rockwool, Inc. v. Owens-Coming FiberglasCorp.,w4 in which plaintiff
claimed defendant disparaged its product, rockwool loosefill
insulation. 395 In addition to claims of common law disparagement and
unfair competition, the case was brought under the Lanham Act and
sections 75-1.1 and 75-5(b)(3), now repealed. 396 Although the court
never identified the section 75-1.1 prong upon which it, or the
plaintiff, proceeded, speaking simply of "section 75-1.1," it rejected
defendant's argument on summary judgment that plaintiff must show
an adverse effect on market competition. 397 The ruling was correct
since the plaintiff's claims necessarily were under the unfair/deceptive
prong of section 75-1.1, where no claim of adverse effect on market
competition could arise. Or, as the courts put it in Chuck's Feed &
Seed and Sewell Plastics, the claims were directed at unfair or
deceptive rather than anticompetitive practices.398
389. Id. at 1292.
390. 720 F. Supp. 1196 (W.D.N.C. 1989), affd in part and remanded in part, No. 893329, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15526 (4th Cir. Sept. 4, 1990) (per curiam).
391. Id. at 1220.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 1220-21.
394. 640 F. Supp. 1411 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
395. Plaintiff's "claims are predicated upon Owens-Corning's advertising, technical
bulletin, and promotional practices with respect to both plaintiff's products and OwensCorning's products." Id. at 1418.
396. Id. at 1417 n.2.
397. Id. at 1434.
398. This statement is required in light of the earlier acknowledgement that common
law "unfair competition" claims were originally encompassed within the "unfair methods
of competition" prong of section 75-1.1, and may not yet have been shifted over to the
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Although correct to this extent, the ruling erred by extending its
reach to reject the concept of adverse effect on market competition as
being relevant in any respect to section 75-1.1 claims. The error
occurred because the court, unlike the courts in Chuck's Feed & Seed
and Sewell Plastics,failed to note the bifurcated character of section
75-1.1. Only one part of the statute reaches unfair and deceptive
practices. The other part covers antitrust/competitive practices
where, absent application of the per se rule, adverse effect on market
competition is a necessary inquiry.2
In summary, it appears that that when plaintiffs invoke section
75-1.1 for purposes of presenting an antitrust/competition case, as
opposed to an unfair/deceptive case, they should be, and probably
will be, required to demonstrate harm to market competition in
addition to harm to themselves.'
B. Van Dom: The Wrong Way Not to Follow FederalPrecedent
An important issue in this Article is the extent to which courts
dealing with antitrust cases under section 75-1.1 will follow federal
antitrust precedent. The general rule of looking to federal precedent
for guidance has been shown. Part A of this section demonstrates
that the courts in section 75-1.1 cases utilize an essential ingredient of
federal antitrust law-an adverse effect on market competition must
be shown either by evidence or by reliance on the per se rule where
unfair/deceptive prong pursuant to Professor Aycock's suggestion. See supra notes 128-29
and accompanying text.
399. The court's failure to make this distinction is revealed by its citing of the Johnson,
Ellis, and Harringtoncases for its position that an adverse effect on competition need not
be shown in 75-1.1 cases. American Rockwool, 640 F. Supp. at 1434. Johnson was a
dispute between a shopping center developer and a mortgage broker. Johnson v. Phoenix
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 260, 266 S.E.2d 610, 619 (1980), overruled on other
grounds by Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 323 N.C. 559, 374 S.E.2d
385 (1988). Ellis alleged misrepresentations about insurance policy coverage. Ellis v.
Smith-Broadhurst, Inc., 48 N.C. App. 180, 180, 268 S.E.2d 271, 272 (1980). Harrington
involved false advertising and "passing off" claims. Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg.
Co., 38 N.C. App. 393,404,248 S.E.2d 739,746 (1978). Since none of these cases involved
"antitrust" facts, no need to demonstrate an adverse effect on market competition arose.
400. This statement is subject to the ongoing caveat that it does not apply in per se
cases and that the requisite showing in some cases is displaced by more specific statutory
and/or judicial requirements. For example, the plaintiff in an attempted monopolization
case must show a "dangerous probability of success," see supra note 106, and the plaintiff
in a Clayton Act case must show that the effect of the defendant's conduct "may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 14,
18 (2000). Moreover, the "adverse effect on competition" inquiry includes the possibility
that the defendant may make pro-efficiency or other arguments by way of justification,
which may require a "balancing" of pro- and anticompetitive effects in order to determine
the net effect on competition. See supra note 64.
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appropriate. In this context, the recent court of appeals decision in
Van Dorn Retail Management, Inc. v. Klaussner FurnitureIndustries,
Inc.4°1 requires attention because of its failure adequately to assess the
policy aspects of the federal precedent it considered.
In Van Dorn, the court of appeals held that secondary line price
discrimination 4° does not violate section 75-1.1.403 The court
reasoned (1) that the supreme court in Rose,4 4 which considered the
legality of secondary line price discrimination under sections 75-1 and
75-5(b)(5), now repealed, held that such discrimination is not "illegal
under any law of the State of North Carolina ' 40 5 and (2) that this
statement must be deemed to include reference to section 75-1.1
because "our Supreme Court was obviously aware that [section] 75''4 6
1.1 had been enacted at the time it rendered its decision in Rose. 0
Even if as a policy matter the outcome of the case was proper,
the court's reasoning was faulty. It read too broadly the Rose court's
reference to "any law" as applying to a statute, section 75-1.1, which
was never mentioned or assessed by the Rose court. It ignored (1)
clear judicial precedent holding that section 5 of the FTC Act covers
violations of the Robinson-Patman Act' and (2) that "our Supreme
Court" said as long ago as 1980 in the Johnson case 48 that "it is
appropriate for us to look to the federal decisions interpreting the
FTC Act for guidance in construing the meaning of G.S. section 751.1. "14o9 The court also discounted the federal court's statement in

401. 132 N.C. App. 531,512 S.E.2d 456 (1999).
402. Secondary line price discrimination is to be distinguished from primary line
discrimination discussed at supra note 318. As noted there, primary line discrimination is
the Robinson-Patman Act nomenclature for predatory pricing, the term applied to the
same practice in Sherman Act monopolization cases. With predatory pricing, also known
primary line price discrimination, the seller seeks to use a low-price policy to harm a
competitor, typically a small competitor in a local market. The seller may seek to
subsidize its low prices against a local competitor with higher prices in other areas.
However, the complainant in a secondary line discrimination case is a customer rather
than a competitor of the seller, typically another local merchant who is put at a
disadvantage by lower prices paid by one of its competitors, usually a large chain
operation. See generally ANTITRUST L. DEV., supra note 44, at 474-81 (describing
primary and secondary line price discrimination).
403. Van Dorn, 132 N.C. App. at 532,512 S.E.2d at 457.
404. 282 N.C. 643, 194 S.E.2d 521 (1973).
405. Id. at 659, 194 S.E.2d at 532.
406. Van Dorn, 132 N.C. App. at 532, 512 S.E.2d at 457.
407. See supra notes 44 and 57 and accompanying text.
408. Johnson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 266 S.E.2d 610 (1980),
overruledon other grounds by Myers & Chapman, Inc. v Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 323 N.C.
559, 374 S.E.2d 385 (1988).
409. Id. at 262,266 S.E.2d at 620.
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L.C. Williams Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp.41 ° that "[i]t is undisputed that
price discrimination among those similarly situated constitutes a clear
violation of North Carolina's unfair trade practice laws."4"'
Rather than ignoring the supreme court's advice to be guided by
"federal decisions interpreting the FTC Act," the court of appeals
might have reasoned that such "guidance" would lead section 75-1.1
interpretation astray. It might have held that for policy reasons
section 75-1.1 should not be read as condemning secondary line price
discrimination. The federal Robinson-Patman Act has long been
criticized for being harmful to, rather than supportive of, consumer
interests,412 and federal enforcement of the statute in recent times has
been virtually nonexistent.41 3 The concern is that aggressive price
competition may be dampened by a company's actions to avoid
Robinson-Patman liability.41 4 However, the opinion turns not on such
analysis of the substantive or policy issues but on a questionable
application, and nonapplication, of the authorities.
The court's decision three years earlier in Hyde4 15 might have
served as a guide for its analysis. Holding, contrary to the federal
rule, that indirect purchasers in North Carolina have standing under
state antitrust law to assert antitrust claims, the court in Hyde
considered the major substantive issue: whether granting standing
both to direct and indirect purchasers would create so much warfare
on the plaintiff side that such cases might be deterred altogether or
that the efficiency of such litigation would be adversely affected.41 6
While one may question the court's conclusion, the substantive policy
issues were at least discussed in Hyde, an observation that cannot be
made for Van Dorn.
C.

Whether Consumers Can Assert "Unfair Methods of
Competition" Claims

Whether consumers can assert unfair methods of competition
claims is an issue because of assertions, in some cases, that the
purpose of the "unfair methods" prong of section 75-1.1 is the

410. 625 F. Supp. 477 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
411. Van Dorn, 132 N.C. App. at 532,512 S.E.2d at 457 (quoting L.C. Williams Oil Co.

v. Exxon Corp., 625 F. Supp. 477,482 (M.D.N.C. 1985)).
412. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 64, at 570-72 (describing criticisms of the
Robinson-Patman Act).

413. Id. at 572.
414. Id. at 570-72.
415. Hyde v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 123 N.C. App. 572,473 S.E.2d 680 (1996).

416. Id. at 583-84,473 S.E.2d at 687-88.
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protection of firms from the "unfair competition" of competitors,
while the purpose of the unfair/deceptive prong is the protection of
consumers. Such terminology could lead to rules that would preclude
consumers from asserting antitrust claims under the unfair methods
prong and would preclude firms from asserting claims under the
unfair/deceptive prong against competitors and others. It could be
argued this would not be a problem if for every conceivable antitrust
violation there will always be an "aggrieved" competitor whose
antitrust lawsuit would protect consumers. But that is not true.
Indeed, with the classical antitrust violations-those that are still
treated as per se illegal-price fixing and allocations of territories
and/or customers, competitors are the beneficiaries of the activity
while consumers suffer the damages. Accordingly, consumers should
be allowed to bring antitrust cases claiming unfair methods of
competition. Any contrary indications in the decided cases so far do
not compel a different outcome.4 17
The strongest judicial suggestion that consumers might be barred
from asserting unfair methods claims comes in two recent insurance
coverage cases. In Henderson v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co.,418 the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff-home buyers in the
underlying action, finding that the builder-defendant had "engaged in
unfair and deceptive practices" by representing that the lot and the
house residing on it would have no water problems.419 Plaintiffs then
sued the builder's insurers, and the question was whether the
builder's misrepresentations were "unfair competition" within the
meaning of the builder's commercial insurance policies.420 Seemingly,
the court could have said that however one defines the term "unfair
competition" as used in the policies, it did not cover these builders'
deceptions. Instead, the court held that there was no coverage,
stating "that the term [unfair competition] refers exclusively to
conduct between competitors. '421 On the way to this conclusion, the

417. This discussion implicates the direct/indirect purchaser issue discussed supra note
53. As noted there, the federal rule bars suits by indirect purchasers (who may frequently
be citizen consumers) while North Carolina law, as a result of the decision in Hyde, 123
N.C. App. at 577, 473 S.E.2d at 684, allows such suits. The concern expressed in the text
would not materialize in North Carolina (1) if the direct purchasers were business firms,
for example, wholesalers or retailers, as opposed to citizen consumers and (2) if they were
not deemed "consumers" for purposes of bringing suits against price-fixing producers.
However, both of these conditions may not always prevail.
418. 346 N.C. 741,488 S.E.2d 234 (1997).
419. Id. at 743,488 S.E.2d at 235-36.
420. Id. at 743-44,488 S.E.2d at 236.
421. Id. at 747, 488 S.E.2d at 238.
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court said that "unfair competition is an offense committed in the
context of competition between business rivals." 4' Noticing section
75-1.1's reference to unfair methods of competition, the court stated
that it is "patterned after" FTC Act section 5.42 The court then cited
FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson,424 which, according to the court,
"clarified that the 'unfair methods of competition' language [in
section 5 of the FTC Act] refers to acts against competitors, while the
'unfair and deceptive practices' language protects consumers. ' 425 The
result, and seemingly an unnecessary one, is a strong suggestion,
albeit not a holding, that consumers may not assert unfair methods of
competition claims under section 75-1.1.426
The Henderson court, however, read Sperry & Hutchinson too
broadly as stating that unfair methods is a competitor complaint,
while unfair/deceptive acts are consumer complaints. It is true that
the Supreme Court in Sperry & Hutchinson said that the 1938
Wheeler-Lea Amendment, which added the unfair/deceptive
language to FTC Act section 5, "made it clear that Congress ...
charged the FTC with protecting consumers as well as
competitors."4 27 The court also quoted a House Report dealing with
the amendment, noting that "[t]his amendment makes the consumer,
who may be injured by an unfair trade practice, of equal concern,
before the law, with the merchant or manufacturer injured by the
unfair methods of a dishonest competitor."4'
Two serious qualifications of Sperry & Hutchinson apply,
however, as it was invoked by the Henderson court. First, both
because it was an FTC case and because section 5 of the FTC Act
carries with it no private right of action, Sperry & Hutchinson
necessarily stated no specific rule regarding whether a competitor or a
consumer may assert an unfair methods cause of action. Second,
42 9 decision
Sperry & Hutchinson applauded the earlier FTC v. Keppe1
422. Id. at 749,488 S.E.2d at 239.
423. Id.
424. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
425. Henderson, 346 N.C. at 749,488 S.E.2d at 239.
426. Less than one year later, the court in Wake Stone Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and
Surety Co., 995 F. Supp. 612 (E.D.N.C. 1998), recited its understanding of the Henderson
ruling, saying that the court there said section 75-1.1 was "divided into two concepts. First
is unfair trade practices against consumers, and the other is unfair competition, which is
self-evidently brought by competitors. The court then held that the insured could not
shoehorn an unfair trade practices claim brought by a consumer into coverage for
common law unfair competition." Id. at 618 (citations omitted).
427. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. at 244.
428. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 75-1613, at 3 (1937) (Su. Doc. No. Y1.1/8:75-1613)).
429. 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
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affirming the FTC's finding that Keppel had engaged in an "unfair
method of competition" by selling packs of candy to children for a
penny and encouraging children to gamble by including a penny in
some of the packages. Although the pre-1938 proceeding was of
necessity an unfair methods case, the Court in Sperry & Hutchinson
noted that Keppel's merchandising system was not particularly
harmful to competitors since "any competitor could [have]
maintain[ed] his position simply by adopting the challenged
practice."430 Also, the Court in Keppel itself had characterized the
4 31
practice as exploitation of an important consumer group, children.
In short, rather than indicating, as the Henderson court suggested,
that "consumers" could not assert an unfair methods claim in private
litigation, the Sperry & Hutchinson decision, while failing to point
with total clarity, arguably suggested the contrary.
More importantly, surrounding the 1997 Henderson decision are
the North Carolina Court of Appeals's 1996 Hyde v. Abbott
Laboratories, Inc.432 decision and the North Carolina Supreme
Court's own 1998 N.C. Steel, Inc. v. National Council on
CompensationInsurance4 33 decision upholding the right of consumers
to assert unfair methods claims. Surprisingly, Hyde is not cited in
Henderson, and Henderson is not cited in N.C. Steel. As noted
above, 434 in Hyde the court of appeals upheld the right of "indirect
purchasers" to seek damages pursuant to section 75-16. 435 This is
4 36 rule,
contrary to the federal Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois
which
allows only direct purchasers to sue. The named plaintiffs, Suzanne
Hyde and Lynn Meeks, represented a class of individual consumers
alleging that the defendants "violated several of the antitrust laws of
this state" by fixing the price of infant formula. 437 Although the
opinion does not specifically mention section 75-1.1, referring instead
to the "antitrust laws of this state" and to "Chapter 75 violations,"
only two Chapter 75 statutes would be applicable, sections 75-1 and
75-1.1. Further, only the unfair methods prong of section 75-1.1
would be applicable since price fixing would not be considered an
"unfair" or "deceptive" act.

430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.

Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. at 243.
Keppel, 291 U.S. at 313.
123 N.C. App. 572,473 S.E.2d 680 (1996).
347 N.C. 627,496 S.E.2d 369 (1998).
See supranote 53 and accompanying text.
Hyde, 123 N.C. App. at 579,473 S.E.2d at 685.
431 U.S. 720 (1977).
Hyde, 123 N.C. App. at 573,473 S.E.2d at 681.
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In N.C. Steel, eight corporate insureds complained that eleven
workers' compensation insurers combined to fix the "servicing carrier
fee", which either increased the premiums they paid for workers'
compensation insurance or shifted them from the voluntary to the
residual market where the premiums were higher.4 8 Although the
opinion did not identify the prong of section 75-1.1 relied upon,
referring simply to sections 75-1 and 75-1.1, 439 and although the court

adopted the federal filed rate doctrine which resulted in dismissal of
the case,44 the claim was analogous to price fixing. Thus, absent the
intervening filed rate defense, the claim would have been
appropriately treated as an unfair method of competition. The
opinion made no reference to the Henderson rule that assertion of
unfair methods claims should be limited to competitors.
Also surrounding the Henderson decision are four cases-Martin
Marietta Corp. v. Wake Stone Corp.441 decided in 1995, Sara Lee Corp
v. Carter42 in 1999, Bepco, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc.443 in 2000, and
Edmondson v. American Motorcycle Ass'n 44 in 2001-recognizing
that nonconsumers may assert unfair/deceptive claims. Martin
Mariettais not cited in Henderson, and Henderson is not cited in Sara
Lee, Bepco or Edmondson. In Martin Marietta, the court upheld and
remanded for trial Martin Marietta's claim for "unfair and deceptive
trade practices" 445 against its competitor, Wake Stone."6 Wake Stone,
with an aggregates quarry in Wake County, engaged in a campaign
directed at local officials and others to prevent Martin Marietta from
acquiring variances and permits to open a quarry in Nash County."7
When Wake Stone's efforts succeeded, Martin Marietta sued,
claiming libel, slander, and "unfair and deceptive trade practices."' 4
Wake Stone obtained summary judgment for libel and slander, but it
eventually lost before the jury on the unfair and deceptive trade
practices claim. 449
438. See N.C. Steel, 347 N.C. at 630-31,496 S.E.2d at 371-72.
439. Id. at 632,496 S.E.2d at 372.
440. Id.
441. 339 N.C. 602,453 S.E.2d 146 (1995) (per curiam).
442. 351 N.C. 27,519 S.E.2d 308 (1999).
443. 106 F. Supp. 2d 814 (M.D.N.C. 2000).
444. No. 99-1299,2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1506 (4th Cir. Feb. 2,2001) (per curiam), affg
in part and vacating in part 54 F. Supp. 2d 544 (W.D.N.C. 1999).
445. This description of the claim appears in Wake Stone Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and
Surety Co., 995 F. Supp. 612,613 (E.D.N.C. 1998).
446. Martin Marietta,339 N.C. at 603,453 S.E.2d at 146-47.
447. Wake Stone, 995 F. Supp. at 613.
448. Id.
449. Id.
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The court in Sara Lee held that the plaintiff-employer was
entitled to its section 75-1.1 trial court judgment for "unfair and
deceptive practices" against its former employee, who, during his
employment as a computer repairman, sold computer parts and
services to his employer through companies he secretly owned.45
Although the court considered whether the claims were not
cognizable under section 75-1.1 because of the employer/employee
relationship and addressed whether the conduct was "in or affecting
commerce," 451 it apparently was not asked to reject the plaintiff's
claims because of the Henderson ruling that the "'unfair and
deceptive practices' language protects consumers. '452 However, the
Sara Lee court did quote United Laboratories,Inc. v. Kuykendal4 53 as
saying, "[w]e have not limited... 75-1.1 to cases involving consumers
only. After all, unfair trade practices involving only businesses affect
the consumer as well." 454

As noted above, 45 5 the plaintiffs in Bepco and Edmondson were
competitors of the defendants. The plaintiff's antitrust claim in
Bepco that Allied-Signal was tying up distributors with exclusive
dealing arrangements was rejected, but certain product
disparagement and defamation claims were allowed to proceed as
"unfair trade practices."456
Similarly, the plaintiff's claim in
Edmondson that defendant sought to take over its joint venture
interest without compensation was allowed to proceed both as an
unfair method of competition and as an unfair or deceptive
practice.457
While Martin Marietta, Sara Lee, Edmondson and Bepco are of
particular interest because of their proximity in time to Henderson,
there are other decisions in which unfair/deceptive claims asserted by
nonconsumers, including competitors, have not been subjected to a
motion to dismiss based on Henderson-style reasoning but have been
allowed to proceed, although not always successfully.45 8
450. Sara Lee Corp. v. Carter, 351 N.C. 27,28-29,519 S.E.2d 308,309 (1999).
451. Id. at 31-32,519 S.E.2d at 311.
452. Henderson v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 346 N.C. 741, 749, 488 S.E.2d 234,
239 (1997).
453. 322 N.C. 643,370 S.E.2d 375 (1988).
454. Sara Lee, 351 N.C. at 32, 519 S.E.2d at 311 (quoting United Labs., Inc. v.
Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643,665,370 S.E.2d 375,389 (1988)) (citations omitted).
455. See supra notes 297-313 and accompanying text.
456. See Bepco, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 814, 829-30, 833-34
(M.D.N.C. 2000).
457. Edmondson v. Am. Motorcycle Ass'n, No. 99-1299, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1506,
at *39-42 (4th Cir. Feb. 2,2001).
458. These include: McDaniel v.Greensboro News Co., 1984-1 Trade Cases (CCH)
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Finally, the Fourth Circuit in Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc.,459 a post-Henderson case, although stressing that
section 75-1.1's "primary purpose is to protect the consuming
public,"46 stated, without reference to Henderson, that "businesses"
may assert unfair/deceptive claims but apparently only when
consumers can be viewed as suffering at least some indirect injury
from the defendant's conduct.4 6' Food Lion's favorable judgment
based on claims of deceptive activity under section 75-1.1 against an
ABC employee was reversed.
The court reasoned that the
misrepresentations of the ABC employee on her Food Lion job
application "did not harm the consuming public" because the point of
the employment was to expose improper handling of meat by Food
Lion employees.4 6 The court said that "businesses" were allowed to
pursue unfair/deceptive claims in the past "against another business
only when the businesses are competitors (or potential competitors)
or are engaged in commercial dealings with each other." 63 Where
these conditions do not hold-as apparently the court felt they did
not in Food Lion-the court seems to say that businesses may press
unfair/deceptive claims only when there is a "competitive or business
relationship that can be policed for the benefit of the consuming
public."464
The potential reach and significance of the language used by the
court is quite uncertain. Even if the court is correct that there had
been no prior "commercial dealings" between Food Lion and ABC,
litigation between "businesses" would seem to be a rare event in the
absence of prior "commercial dealings" between them. If so, the
seeds of any amendments to unfair/deceptive law represented by
Food Lion have little ground upon which to fall. In any event, Food
Lion certainly serves to dispute Henderson to the extent that it
recognizes that businesses have been allowed to press
unfair/deceptive claims in the past and are likely to in the future.
In summary, the suggestion of Henderson-thatconsumers may
not be allowed to assert unfair methods claims-should not be, and

65,792 (M.D.N.C. 1983); Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Goel, 146 N.C. App. 137, 555
S.E.2d 281 (2001); and Harrington Manufacturing Co. v. Powell Manufacturing Co., 38
N.C. App. 393,248 S.E.2d 739 (1978).
459. 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
460. Id. at 519.
461. Id. at 519-20.
462. Id. at 520.
463. Id.
464. Id.
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seems unlikely to be, followed. Cases before and after Henderson
strongly indicate that consumers will be allowed to assert such claims.
CONCLUSION

This Article produces the following recommendations for
application of section 75-1.1. First, litigants invoking and courts
applying this statute should take the advice of the Fourth Circuit in
Chuck's Feed & Seed by noting early which of the "two distinct kinds
of conduct" the case presents-"unfair or deceptive practices [or]
anticompetitive practices."465 More specifically, they should carefully
and specifically consider whether the conduct at issue is (1) an unfair
method of competition, (2) an unfair practice, or (3) a deceptive
practice. These are three separate offenses for which clear and
separate elements should be articulated. Anyone who uses the
phrase "unfair trade practice" should make clear which one of the
three offenses is intended.
Second, conduct having antitrust character or involving actual or
potential anticompetitive practices should be evaluated as an unfair
method of competition. The methodology and decisions of the FTC
section 5 authorities should be looked to closely for guidance in
applying the unfair methods prong of section 75-1.1.466 This includes
using the traditional per se/rule of reason analytical structures and the
requirement that plaintiffs be prepared to show an actual or
threatened adverse effect on market competition in a case proceeding
under the rule of reason. Putting aside inter- and intrastate
commerce differences, conduct that violates the federal Sherman,
Clayton, and Robinson-Patman Acts, and the unfair methods prong
of section 5 of the FTC Act, as well as the North Carolina General
Statutes sections 75-1 and 75-2.1, also violates the unfair methods
prong of section 75-1.1. The analysis required for application of the
unfair methods prong of section 75-1.1 is, or should be, identical to
the analysis required under these other federal and state statutes.

465. Chuck's Feed & Seed Co., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 810 F.2d 1289, 1292 (4th Cir.
1987).
466. This advice applies only to conduct having antitrust character or involving
anticompetitive practices under scrutiny as an unfair method of competition. It does not
apply to other non-antitrust conduct, such as unfair competition, tortious interference with
contract, or other business torts that may also qualify as an unfair method of competition.
To avoid this muddle, it would be very useful to accept Professor Aycock's advice from
thirty years ago to transfer all non-antitrust conduct to the unfair/deceptive prong of
section 75-1.1. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.

2002]

UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES

1999

One caution is required. Courts applying section 75-1.1 should
tread carefully before extending the unfair methods prong to cover
conduct that has been found by the FTC, or by its reviewing courts, to
violate the unfair methods prong of section 5 of the FTC Act, but
which would not violate the Sherman, Clayton, or Robinson-Patman
Acts. The reason for this caution is that the penalties that can be
assigned to such conduct under section 75-1.1, that is, treble damages
and attorney fees, are substantially more onerous than the injunctive
and other relief the FTC can obtain in enforcing section 5 of the FTC
Act. There should be no doubt, however, that consumers have
standing to assert antitrust claims as unfair methods of competition
under section 75-1.1.
Third, where conduct having antitrust character or involving
anticompetitive practices is found not to offend mainline antitrust
standards, courts in section 75-1.1 cases should be on guard to prevent
the statute's application to produce treble damages and attorney fee
awards under either prong of the statute. Such an outcome could
occur either if the unfair methods prong incorporated a lower-thanantitrust burden of proof or if the "unfair" or "deceptive" practices
categories too readily reached out to condemn such conduct.
Misapplication of the unfair methods prong can be avoided if it is
recognized as a plain antitrust statute. When dealing with conduct
having antitrust character but which has been found not to be an
unfair method of competition-that is, not an antitrust violation-a
court should proceed cautiously before allowing the same conduct to
be found "unfair" or "deceptive." Conduct having antitrust character
but that does not violate antitrust standards will only infrequently
deserve to be found "unfair" and even more rarely, if ever, deserve to
be found deceptive. Application of the "substantial aggravating
factors" criterion to conduct having antitrust character can also help
prevent the "unfair" and "deceptive" offenses from becoming overeager receptacles for practices passing the antitrust test.
Finally, in all section 75-1.1 cases, courts should keep consumer
welfare in mind as a key test. Conduct not harming or threatening to
harm consumer welfare does not violate the unfair methods prong
applied as an antitrust statute. Even plaintiffs in non-antitrust unfair
and deceptive practices cases should be unable to prevail if their
victory would be contrary to the best long-run interests of consumers.
Where the court faces either a free-standing business tort or a
business tort presented as a case of unfairness or deception under
section 75-1.1, it should also keep consumer welfare clearly in mind
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and should give full scope to any "competition defense" presented by
the defendant.

